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Justifications, Powers, and Authority 
abstract.   Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago when 
George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction between justifications and 
excuses. In the intervening years, however, very little progress has been made in exploring the 
structure and function of justification defenses. The reason for this failure, I suggest, is a widely 
shared misconception about their place within the criminal law’s institutional structure. 
Contrary to what is generally believed, it is not up to trial courts to decide ex post facto what 
conduct is justified and what is not. This determination is made ex ante by other institutional 
actors such as private fiduciaries, public officials, and sometimes, ordinary citizens caught in 
extraordinary circumstances. The court’s role is simply to review the validity of that prior 
exercise of decision-making discretion. More broadly, my study is intended to serve as a 
reminder of the importance of institutional structure in criminal law. It is almost always 
misleading to address issues in criminal law by way of abstract moral theorizing, as is often done, 
because this leaves out the crucial question of institutional division of labor. Before addressing 
the substantive aspect of particular questions—what conduct should be prohibited, justified, or 
excused—we must first address ourselves to the institutional questions that I have called the 
problems of authority, discretion, and legality. These institutional questions receive their most 
thorough treatment in two other areas of law: the private law of fiduciaries and public 
administrative law. If we wish to make progress in understanding justification defenses—and the 
institutional structure of criminal law more generally—I argue that it is to these areas of law that 
we should attend. 
author.   Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada. This 
Essay was initially prepared for a special workshop on “Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of 
Criminal Law” at the Twenty-Third IVR World Congress in Kraków, Poland, in August 2007. I 
would like to thank the organizers, Antony Duff and Christoffer Wong, my commentator, 
Sandra Marshall, and all participants in the workshop for their valuable input. Thanks also to 
Lauren Wihak for her research assistance and to Markus Dubber, George Fletcher, Evan Fox-
Decent, Kent Greenawalt, Hamish Stewart, Bob Sullivan, and Jeremy Waldron for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. I owe special thanks to Larissa Katz and Arthur Ripstein for detailed 
comments on numerous drafts. Work on this Essay was supported by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Queen’s University Advisory Research 
Committee. 
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introduction 
Sometimes, we are legally permitted to do what the criminal law generally 
prohibits: police officers are entitled to restrain suspects to effect a lawful 
arrest; parents may use force on their children to discipline them; a ship’s crew 
is allowed to jettison passengers’ property to save the ship in a storm; and 
ordinary citizens are permitted to use deadly force to protect themselves when 
their lives are threatened. In all these cases and many more, we say that the 
actor is entitled to do what is generally prohibited because his conduct is legally 
justified, that is, he has a valid justification defense. 
Over the past thirty years, justification defenses have been the subject of a 
protracted debate in criminal law theory. Much of that debate has been based 
on an evaluation of the conduct itself according to rival moral theories: 
utilitarians (such as Paul Robinson) suppose that conduct should be legally 
justified so long as it prevents more harm than it causes, while those who focus 
on the structure of practical reasoning (such as George Fletcher and John 
Gardner) suppose that conduct should be legally justified whenever the reasons 
in favor of acting outweigh those against and the act was done for the right 
reason. But the law does not recognize conduct as justified simply on the basis 
of its merits according to either of these moral theories. There is also another 
factor—the actor’s legal role—that forms a distinct and important 
consideration: for example, a police officer is entitled to make arrests in 
contexts where a private citizen is not; a corrections official may punish an 
offender in situations where others may not; and a parent may use disciplinary 
force on his child when a stranger may not. In all these cases and more, the law 
recognizes that, by virtue of their roles, these persons are legally justified in 
taking action that many others would be criminally prohibited from pursuing. 
This revelation about the importance of the actor’s role might lead us to 
conclude that conduct is legally justified simply on the basis of these two 
variables: the moral merits of the conduct itself and the actor’s legal role. But 
things are still more complicated than that. Even those who play the 
appropriate legal role (corrections officials, police officers, and so on) are 
justified in acting only after the appropriate decision maker has approved the 
conduct—that is, has decided that the conduct was justified. For example, a 
corrections official cannot take it upon herself to administer punishment until a 
court has decided (through a proper trial and sentencing hearing) that the 
offender should be punished in a certain way. If the corrections official decided 
to impose punishment before the court had imposed sentence, the law would 
treat her as an unjustified vigilante. This is so even though it is the job of a 
corrections official to impose punishment and even if the “punishment” she 
would administer on her own is precisely what a court ultimately deems to be 
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appropriate. Similarly, under ordinary conditions, police officers may search 
private homes for evidence only after a justice of the peace has decided (by 
granting a search warrant) that the search is legally justified. Even though it is 
part of a police officer’s job to undertake searches, and even though a warrant 
would have been granted had the police applied for one, the law does not 
generally recognize a warrantless police search as justified. Neither the merits 
of the conduct as such nor the legal role of the actor is enough on its own; 
rather, for conduct to be legally justified, the appropriate decision maker must 
have made an authoritative decision that it is so. 
This analysis suggests that there is a division of labor between those who 
have the legal power1 to decide what conduct is, and is not, legally justified in 
the circumstances and those who carry out that conduct. And indeed, this 
division of labor is at work in a wide variety of contexts. We find that most 
bureaucratic hierarchies are structured largely in terms of this distinction. For 
example, high ranking police officials have a good deal of power to decide what 
conduct is legally justified (for example, when it is appropriate to use force in a 
hostage-taking situation, or how to conduct a major drug bust), but they 
engage in very little of that conduct themselves. By contrast, junior police 
officers have much less power to decide what conduct is legally justified, but 
they actually carry out most of the conduct that senior officers have approved. 
In the private sector, we also find this bureaucratic hierarchy at work. For 
example, the captain of a ship usually decides when jettisoning passengers’ 
property to save the ship would be justified, but crewmembers then actually 
carry out this task. This division of labor is also often present elsewhere in the 
private sector, even in the absence of any formal bureaucratic hierarchy. For 
example, parents have the power to decide whether or not an operation on 
their child would be justified, but then a team of medical professionals actually 
carries out the operation. 
Sometimes, however, the division of labor between the person who decides 
what conduct is justified and the person who carries out the justified conduct is 
only notional, for sometimes those two persons are actually one and the same: 
for example, when a police officer makes a warrantless arrest, she both decides 
whether the use of force is justified under the circumstances and then carries 
out the arrest. Similarly, when a parent uses force to discipline her child, that 
parent both decides what disciplinary force is appropriate under the 
 
1.  I use the expression “legal power” in the technical sense set out by Wesley Hohfeld. See 
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). For a thorough treatment of the crucial role 
of decision in legal powers, see Andrew Halpin, The Concept of a Legal Power, 16 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 129 (1996). 
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circumstances and then carries it out. And perhaps most importantly, when a 
citizen uses force in self-defense, she both determines whether or not the force 
is justified and then actually uses that force to defend herself. 
The important point to focus on, however, is not whether there is an actual 
or merely notional division of labor between those who have the power to 
decide what conduct is justified and those carrying it out; rather, the critical 
point is that all justifications involve the exercise of a legal power—an 
authoritative decision by the appropriate person that a certain course of action 
is justified under the circumstances. Further, we find that the law accords some 
decision makers a good deal more discretion in the exercise of their decision-
making power than others. In the case of self-defense, for example, the law 
gives the decision maker quite detailed criteria to apply to the facts at hand: she 
must decide not only whether it is necessary, under the circumstances, for her 
to use force to defend herself, but if so, what force would be proportionate to 
the nature of the threat she faces. In other cases, the decision maker has 
considerably wider discretion. For example, when senior police officers 
authorize a “sting” operation, they must decide what sorts of otherwise 
criminal activity their officers may engage in, a decision likely to involve 
balancing broad considerations of public safety against the societal harms 
inherent in allowing police officers to engage in serious criminal activity. In 
other words, although the scope of discretion may vary widely from one 
justification to another, the fact is that all such decisions require at least some 
case-by-case discretion about when it is justified to do what the criminal law 
generally prohibits. 
There are two important normative conclusions I mean to draw from this 
analysis of the conceptual structure of justification defenses. First, I will 
suggest that the way in which courts should evaluate claims of justification 
ought to reflect their proper institutional role. Since all justifications involve 
discretionary decision making, I argue, courts should always approach the 
evaluation of any justification claim, not by evaluating the underlying conduct 
de novo; rather, they should engage in a more limited review of the prior 
exercise of discretion. For example, where a court is asked to evaluate a 
warrantless arrest, it should not be considering de novo whether it would have 
acted similarly. Rather, the question is whether the police officer exercised his 
decision-making authority—his discretion—reasonably. More generally, so 
long as the decision maker (be she a justice of the peace, a police officer, a 
parent, or even an ordinary citizen) was within her jurisdiction in making that 
decision and so long as she reached her conclusions in the proper way, her 
decision should stand. 
The second normative conclusion I mean to draw from the foregoing 
analysis is that we should consider the political legitimacy of claims of 
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justification from a different point of view. Most writers largely ignore the 
problems of institutional division of labor at work in criminal law and focus 
their attentions almost exclusively on the merits of that conduct and perhaps 
on the legal role of the actor. But I suggest that the most important aspect of 
justifications is the discretion wielded by certain individuals to decide what 
conduct is justified and what is not. Accordingly, I argue that most of our 
normative attention should be focused on the legal recognition and control of 
that discretion: who should wield it, how broad their discretion should be, 
what guidance the law should give to them, and so on. 
In answering these questions, we should keep in mind the political 
legitimacy challenges that this sort of discretionary power might present. 
Perhaps the most pressing normative question raised by this analysis is how we 
might be able to render this sort of discretion over the affairs of others 
compatible with traditional liberal respect for individual freedom.2 We might 
at first miss the significant normative problems raised by justification defenses. 
After all, there is another place in criminal law in which ordinary citizens can 
decide what conduct is and is not criminal, namely, the granting or 
withholding of consent to others’ interference with our own affairs. For 
example, each of us has the power to render lawful otherwise wrongful conduct 
such as the taking of our property, entrance onto our land, or interference with 
our bodily integrity simply by consenting to such conduct. But consent does 
not raise similar problems of political legitimacy because justifications differ 
from consent in one crucial respect: whereas consent concerns power over our 
own affairs, justifications always involve power over the affairs of others. 
Whether this is in the private sphere (where parents decide whether their 
children should be disciplined or captains decide whether their passengers’ 
property should be jettisoned), in the public law context (where justices of the 
peace decide whether private homes may be searched, and courts decide who 
may be punished and how), or in the somewhat murkier contexts of self-
defense and lesser evils (where ordinary citizens decide whether others may be 
killed or their property destroyed), justifications always involve a decision by 
one party about justified interferences with the affairs of another. And this, of 
 
2.  The notion of freedom I have in mind here is what is sometimes called “freedom as 
independence.” It is not concerned with maximizing the number of valuable options 
available to each person (as most utilitarians or perfectionists would have it). Rather, it is 
the simple notion that it should be up to each person—and no one else—to decide the 
purposes to which her body and her property shall be put. For more on this notion and the 
related notions of Kantian “external freedom” and Republican notions of “freedom as non-
domination,” see Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 10 (2004). 
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course, raises deep issues at the core of liberalism concerning individual 
freedom. 
As the beginning of an answer to this question of liberal legitimacy, I 
suggest that there are already doctrines at work in the law that can help us to 
render this exercise of legal power by some over the affairs of others compatible 
with a commitment to individual freedom: notably, the concept of fiduciary 
relationships and duties. In the private law context, for example, the fiduciary 
relationship provides a normative framework in this regard. The relationship 
between fiduciary and beneficiary—for example, parent-child, doctor-patient, 
captain-passenger, director-corporation, and many more—imposes a set of 
normative constraints that are designed to render the fiduciary’s exercise of 
power over the beneficiary compatible with the beneficiary’s autonomy. In the 
public law context, the norms of administrative law are similarly designed to 
render the discretion of public officials over their subjects’ affairs compatible 
with the individual rights of those subjects. Indeed, I argue that there are a 
number of important similarities between the normative constraints on 
fiduciaries in private law and those imposed on public officials in 
administrative law.3 Finally, I shall argue that the best way to make normative 
sense of the power wielded by citizens over the affairs of others—power that is 
manifest in the justifications of citizens’ arrest, self-defense, and lesser evils—is 
to conceive of the former as public officials pro tempore of necessity. It is only 
insofar as they are performing a public function that ordinary citizens have the 
authority to make such judgments, and accordingly, they are bound by similar 
normative constraints when deciding what conduct is justified as public 
officials would be in the same situation. 
i. the justifications debate so far 
In this first Part of the Essay, I set out the groundwork for my own account 
of justification defenses. Because justification defenses are the subject of so 
much controversy and disagreement, I begin by setting out some of the most 
basic structural features of these defenses upon which there is widespread 
agreement. Once I have established this common ground, I consider whether 
the two best-known accounts of justification defenses from the past thirty years 
are able to account for these agreed-upon features of justifications. In 
 
3.  For what is perhaps the most thorough treatment of the analogy between private fiduciaries 
and the position of public officials in administrative law, see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary 
Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006). 
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reviewing the failings of these accounts, I find the beginnings of my own 
account, focused on the crucial role of legal powers. 
A. Introducing Justifications 
My analysis of justification defenses is grounded in a close examination of 
their place within the conceptual structure of contemporary Anglo-American 
criminal law doctrine. I assume that such an analysis can help us to understand 
the function of justifications and to answer larger questions of political 
legitimacy that surround justifications in criminal law theory. Before I begin 
this analysis, however, a few words about the merits of this approach are in 
order. 
1. Methodological Preliminaries: The Concern with Structure 
For many years, most commentators on the criminal law almost entirely 
ignored any questions about its conceptual structure, particularly as it concerns 
justification defenses. They assumed, as generations of scholars before them 
had done, that the criminal law was nothing more than “an instrument of the 
state,”4 one that the state could shape in whatever way best served its favored 
policy objectives. As late as 1975, George Fletcher lamented quite accurately 
that the “instrumentalist style of thought is so deeply entrenched in the United 
States that it is hard for our commentators and draftsmen to think of a reason 
for punishing or not punishing that is not a function of the ends of the criminal 
law.”5 
Over the past thirty years, a number of criminal law theorists have 
questioned the wisdom of this wholly instrumentalist account of the criminal 
law. Paul Robinson, George Fletcher, John Gardner, and others have insisted 
that the concepts at work in criminal law give rise to a certain structure that we 
have good reason to respect. They have argued that, insofar as we use terms 
such as “justification,” legislators should examine the concept of justification in 
moral theory more closely and the sort of conceptual structure to which it gives 
rise. For example, Robinson has argued that conduct is justified so long as it 
prevents more harm than it causes.6 Fletcher and Gardner have insisted that 
conduct is justified so long as, first, the reasons in favor of the conduct 
 
4.  JEROME MICHAEL & MORTIMER J. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 342-43 (1933). 
5.  George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA 
L. REV. 293, 293-94 (1975). 
6.  See infra text accompanying note 41. 
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outweigh the reasons against it, and, second, the actor did it for the right 
reasons.7 But as Mitchell Berman has pointed out, one important problem with 
these accounts is that justification defenses in criminal law do not, in fact, 
reflect these accounts of moral justification at all.8 Berman notes that the 
criminal law does not deem morally permissible conduct such as civil 
disobedience to be justified.9 And he notes that the criminal law does deem to 
be justified such morally impermissible conduct as the use of force against an 
old, deranged and disabled intruder to one’s home where retreat was an 
available alternative to the use of force.10 Insofar as the very purpose of the 
Robinson and Fletcher/Gardner accounts is to explain why the criminal law 
has the structure it does, therefore, they have failed. 
One conclusion we might draw from the failure of these attempts to 
discover the conceptual structure of justification defenses in criminal law is that 
we should forget about the conceptual analysis of criminal law altogether and 
simply focus on trying to achieve the instrumentalists’ policy objectives. 
Berman sets out this conclusion quite succinctly as follows: “I hope to prod 
scholars to argue for their favored articulations of particular defenses (like 
particular offenses) in terms of good policy broadly conceived—justice, 
fairness, efficiency, administrability, and the like—not in terms of conceptual 
or logical truths.”11 But as I shall endeavor to show, this is not the only 
conclusion one can draw from the failure of these particular conceptual 
arguments. Instead, I argue that there is indeed a complex and in some ways 
attractive12 conceptual structure to criminal law justification defenses. Further, 
I shall endeavor to show that a close examination of this conceptual structure 
may shed considerable light on some of the most basic issues in criminal law 
theory. 
In order to make progress, however, we must (temporarily) put aside 
abstract theorization about what conduct our favored moral theories would 
 
7.  See infra text accompanying note 58. 
8.  See Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (2003). 
9.  Id. at 11. 
10.  Id. at 14. 
11.  Id. at 77. 
12.  I hope to make clear below precisely how this conceptual structure is attractive. I aim to 
show that it provides a remarkably subtle balancing of a variety of system-wide 
considerations. By granting decision-making power to actors “on the ground,” justifications 
provide flexibility and creativity when dealing with nonideal conditions. But by maintaining 
strict standards of judicial review, the law also retains control over the discretion wielded by 
these decision makers. It is precisely this combination of flexibility and accountability that is 
also the promise of administrative law. 
1070.THORBURN.1130.DOC 4/22/2008 3:39:00 PM 
justifications, powers, and authority 
1079 
 
hold to be justified and consider the role that justification is supposed to play 
within the institutional framework of a modern criminal justice system. We 
must keep in mind that the criminal law is not just a set of directives to 
citizens; rather, it sets out a basic institutional framework that applies to all—
state and citizen alike.13 By taking account of justifications’ role in allocating 
decision-making power within the legal order, it is therefore possible both to 
explain the general structure of justifications and to make clear the normative 
issues they raise. 
2. Three Structural Features of Justification Defenses 
Roughly thirty years ago, English-speaking commentators began to notice 
that one class of criminal law defenses performed quite a different function 
from all the others.14 Recognizing the distinction between legal rules that 
individuals use to guide their conduct and the conceptually secondary set of 
rules that direct courts to impose sanctions when the primary set have been 
breached,15 some commentators noticed that justifications seemed to fit within 
 
13.  Victoria Nourse is one of the very few commentators on criminal law who has made a 
similar argument. See V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1691, 1697 (2003) (“[T]he criminal law should be seen as a fundamental agent in 
maintaining a just relation between citizen and state. Although this premise is widely 
accepted by rather ancient political philosophers, one is unlikely to read about it in much 
contemporary scholarship on the criminal law or political theory.” (citation omitted)). 
14.  The Robinson-Fletcher exchange in the UCLA Law Review in 1975 is where the debate began 
in earnest. See Fletcher, supra note 5; Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal 
Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975). Of course, some 
writers, such as H.L.A. Hart and J.L. Austin, set out the distinction between justification 
and excuse earlier. See J.L. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123 (1961); 
H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28 
(1968). The Model Penal Code makes a distinction between these two types of defenses as 
well. Justifications are dealt with in article 3 and excuses are dealt with in article 2. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08-2.13, 3.01-3.11 (1985). 
15.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 
1994). H.L.A. Hart points out the crucial importance of this distinction as follows: 
Plainly we shall conceal the characteristic way in which such rules function if we 
concentrate on, or make primary, the rules requiring the courts to impose the 
sanctions in the event of disobedience; for these latter rules make provision for 
the breakdown or failure of the primary purpose of the system. They may indeed 
be indispensable but they are ancillary. 
Id. at 39. I refer here to H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between rules regulating conduct and rules 
regulating the imposition of punishment rather than Meir Dan-Cohen’s later treatment of 
this question in order to avoid taking on some of the conclusions Dan-Cohen draws from 
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the first set of rules, whereas most other defenses fall within the second. And 
while all defenses have the effect of saving the accused from some or all of the 
punishment he would otherwise receive, only justification defenses do this on 
the grounds that his conduct was in fact legally permissible.16 
The characteristic of justification defenses that has most puzzled criminal 
law theorists over the past thirty years is that although these defenses, like 
offense definitions, ultimately concern what conduct is and is not criminally 
prohibited, they have a very distinctive conceptual structure that makes it 
impossible to think of them merely as exceptions to criminal prohibitions. In 
fact, justifications seem to have quite a distinct and consistent structure, 
defined by three features in particular.17 The first two features have attracted 
the most attention over the years, but I argue that it is the third of these 
features that provides the most insight into the place of justifications within 
the criminal law more generally. 
The first distinctive feature of justification defenses (which marks them out 
as more than just ordinary exceptions to criminal prohibitions) is that while 
prohibitions are defined in terms of prohibited means, justifications are set out 
in terms of preferred ends. That is, the criminal law identifies conduct for 
prohibition in terms of the means employed—killing a human being, for 
example, or taking someone’s property without her consent—without any 
concern for how noble or how base the actor’s ends might be in doing so. This 
point is captured in the oft-quoted (though slightly inaccurate) dictum that the 
criminal law is concerned with conduct but never with motive.18 Justifications, 
 
this distinction. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 667-73 (1984). 
16.  This is a point on which even instrumentalists about the criminal law such as Mitchell 
Berman can agree. See Berman, supra note 8, at 32-37. Berman makes this point using Meir 
Dan-Cohen’s language of “conduct rules” and “decision rules.” See Dan-Cohen, supra note 
15. 
17.  There are many other features, too, that are not as significant for our purposes, such as 
evidentiary burdens, the rule of law, and vagueness constraints, among others. George 
Fletcher discusses some of these other features of justification. See George P. Fletcher, The 
Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 175-86 (Stephen Shute, John 
Gardner & Jeremy Horder eds., 1993). 
18.  See Commonwealth v. DePetro, 39 A.2d 838, 840 (Pa. 1944) (“Proof of motive is never 
necessary . . . .”); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“[M]otive is 
not an essential element of a crime but . . . evidence of motive is always admissible because it 
is relevant as a circumstance tending to prove the commission of an offense.”). The same is 
true in Canada. See R. v. Imrich, [1974] 6 O.R.2d 496, 503 (Can. Ont. Ct. App.) (“Motive 
relates to a consequence ulterior to the mens rea and the actus reus and, adopting this 
criterion, motive is irrelevant to criminal responsibility . . . .”), aff’d, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 622; see 
also United States v. Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, 497-98, ¶ 81 (Can.) (“It does not matter to 
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however, are always defined in terms of the actor’s ends but do not necessarily 
specify the particular means by which to accomplish those ends: for example, 
one is justified in doing whatever is necessary (within proportionality limits)19 
for the end of defending oneself, or using force on one’s own child for the end of 
disciplining the child. To reflect this emphasis on ends rather than means, 
justifications bear what is sometimes called a “reasons requirement.”20 
According to this requirement, one has a valid claim of self-defense only if 
one’s reason for action (one’s end) was to defend oneself; one has a valid claim 
of lawful arrest only if one’s reason for using force was to make a lawful arrest; 
and so on. The mere fact that one’s conduct had a desirable effect is not 
enough.21 
A second characteristic feature of justification defenses also distinguishes 
them from mere exceptions to offense definitions: their fault standard. 
Whereas particular prohibitions (including any exceptions built into them) are 
subject to a variety of different fault standards, justifications are almost always 
 
society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused’s motive was, but 
only what the accused intended to do.”).  
19.  The place of proportionality in justifications has been highly controversial. In some early 
German case law, following the dictum that “right ought never yield to wrong,” there was 
no proportionality limit at all. See Landgericht Bamberg [LG] [Bamberg trial court] Sept. 
20, 1920, 55 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] 82 (F.R.G). In the 
common law world, however, it has long been recognized that the mere fact that one is 
resisting a wrongdoer does not provide an absolute right of resistance. Resistance to a 
wrongdoer provides a good—but not necessarily determinative—reason to act. 
20.  This is sometimes called the “Dadson doctrine” after the nineteenth-century case in which it 
was most clearly stated. See R. v. Dadson, (1850) 169 Eng. Rep. 407. Importantly, this 
characteristic is shared with excuses such as duress and provocation. Also, it should be noted 
that the reasons requirement only demands that the justifying reason be among one’s 
reasons for action. In some American jurisdictions, the justifying reason (in cases of 
necessity) must also be the actor’s primary (though still not exclusive) reason for action. See, 
e.g., Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 511 
N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 1987). In Canada, the justifying reason need not have been one’s only—or 
even primary—reason for action. In order to meet the elements of the self-defense 
justification, an accused who causes death or grievous bodily harm must have had a 
reasonable belief that he could not otherwise preserve himself from serious harm. See 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 34(2)(b) (1985); R. v. Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3 
(Can.). 
21.  This raises, however, the defense of ex post facto vindication, which is a defense in some 
cases in England (such as a police officer who is justified on the basis of a “hunch” that turns 
out to be correct, even though he had no reasonable and probable grounds for it at the 
time). Tony Honoré has argued that these justifications cannot fit within any of the 
accounts canvassed so far. But this sort of justification seems to be an outlier—an unusual 
and unprincipled exception to the general rule. See John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, 
in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103, 125 n.39 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996). 
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subject to the same independent fault standard of reasonable belief.22 This 
would make it extremely difficult to assimilate justifications and prohibitions 
into a single, unified set of conduct rules. For example, if the justification of 
self-defense were to be incorporated into the definition of the offense of 
murder, this would significantly change the scope of criminal liability. As it 
stands, someone with an honest but unreasonable belief that deadly force was 
necessary to protect his own life would be convicted of murder.23 But if “non-
self-defense” were made an element of the offense, then any honest belief that 
deadly force was necessary and proportionate to the threat, however 
unreasonable, would suffice to negate mens rea and thereby ensure an acquittal 
of the accused. 
Finally, there is a third feature of justification defenses that has attracted 
very little attention in the literature so far but which also marks them out as 
 
22.  The concept of “reasonable belief” is fixed within the wording of many statutory 
justifications in the United States and Canada. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Mayer, 308 
N.E2d 601, 604 (Ill. 1974); People v. Williams, 205 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ill. Ct. App. 1965); 
Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y. 193, 197 (1849) (reasonable belief in need for self-defense). The 
Model Penal Code precludes justification where “the actor was reckless or negligent . . . in 
appraising the necessity for his conduct . . . in a prosecution for any offense for which 
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). Provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code, justifying the use of 
force or the commission of an offense, all mandate that the belief as to the necessity of using 
force or committing an offense be reasonable and proportional in the circumstances. See 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 25-33 (1985). Similarly, a Canadian defendant 
pleading self-defense must believe, “on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise 
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm.” Id. § 34(2). For cases dealing with 
reasonable belief in self-defense, see, for example, R. v. Malott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123 (Can.); 
R. v. Petel, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); and R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.). 
In the United Kingdom, reasonableness is at the heart both of self-defense and the 
prevention of crime. See, e.g., The Queen v. McInnes, (1971) 55 Crim. App. 551 (C.A.) (Eng.) 
(finding that the failure to retreat before resorting to violence was merely a factor that ought 
to be considered when assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct); Devlin v. 
Armstrong, [1971] N. Ir. L.R. 13 (same). Courts more generally have suggested that 
reasonableness should be judged on broad and liberal grounds. See, e.g., Reed v. Wastie, 
[1972] Crim. L.R. 221 (Wales); R. v. Julien, (1969) 2 All E.R. 856 (A.C.) (Eng.). A police 
constable is entitled to take any steps in preventing a breach of the peace that he 
“reasonably” thinks are necessary. See Piddington v. Bates, (1961) 1 W.L.R. 162 (Q.B.) 
(Eng.). Further, the Criminal Law Act provides that “[a] person may use such force as is 
reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the 
lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.” See 
Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 3(1) (Eng.). 
23.  Of course, the interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable belief in the circumstances is 
notoriously generous in the case of self-defense. In Justice Holmes’s famous words, 
“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v. 
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
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something more than just legislated exceptions to criminal prohibitions. The 
law does not simply lay out justification defenses as permissions to do what is 
generally prohibited. Rather, it recognizes that when certain individuals, with 
the requisite legal power, validly decide that their conduct is justified under the 
circumstances, that decision is legally effective. That is, when those individuals 
decide that it is justified to do something that is generally prohibited, that very 
decision brings about a change in what we are legally permitted to do. Perhaps 
the clearest example of this phenomenon is where a justice of the peace 
exercises his legal power and decides that a police officer is justified in carrying 
out an otherwise prohibited assault as part of an arrest, or when he is justified 
in doing what would otherwise constitute a trespass as part of a lawful search.24 
But this is equally true of police officers who may decide when citizens are 
justified in doing things that are generally prohibited in order to assist them in 
pursuing important law enforcement purposes,25 or parents who may decide 
 
24.  U.S. courts have held that the effect of a search warrant is to authorize and make lawful that 
which legally could not have been done without its issuance. See Creech v. United States, 97 
F.2d. 390 (5th Cir. 1938). In the United States, the issuance of search warrants by federal 
courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: “After receiving an affidavit 
or other information, a magistrate judge—or if authorized by Rule 41(b), a judge of a state 
court of record—must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a 
person or property or to install and use a tracking device.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d). 
In Canada, the Criminal Code sets out the procedure a justice of the peace must follow 
in granting a search or arrest warrant. Under section 487, 
A justice who is satisfied . . . that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
there is in a building, receptacle or place (a) anything on or in respect of which 
any offence against this Act or any other Act of Parliament has been or is 
suspected to have been committed, (b) anything that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe will afford evidence with respect to the commission of an 
offence, or will reveal the whereabouts of a person who is believed to have 
committed an offence, against this Act or any other Act of Parliament, (c) 
anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe is intended to be used for 
the purpose of committing any offence against the person for which a person may 
be arrested without warrant, or (c.1) any offence-related property, may at any 
time issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer . . . to search the building, 
receptacle or place for any such thing and to seize it. 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 487 (1985).  
25.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (1985); see also Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 3(1) (Eng.). 
The Canadian Criminal Code justifies the use of force for any peace officer or individual 
lawfully assisting a peace officer in the act of making an arrest or executing process. Canada 
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 25(5) (West 2008). Another provision justifies the 
commission of an act or an omission that would otherwise constitute an offense if the 
person committing the conduct was acting under the direction of a public officer, and that 
the actor reasonably believed the public officer had the authority to give such direction. 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 25.1 (West 2008).  
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that it is justified under the circumstances to use force to discipline their 
children.26 More controversially, I shall argue that this is even true of ordinary 
citizens who may decide when it is justified to use lethal force in their own 
defense.27 
Indeed, it is the importance of a valid decision by the appropriate 
individual that gives meaning to the crucial distinction between vigilantism 
and lawful police activity. When vigilantes such as the self-styled “Minutemen” 
in the United States decide to take it upon themselves to carry out the duties of 
 
26.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985) (codifying a justification for the “Use of Force by 
Persons with Special Responsibility for Care, Discipline or Safety of Others”). In State v. 
England, 349 P.2d 668 (Or. 1960), a parent was held not liable for a child’s death, which 
resulted from the negligent administration of lawful punishment. American courts have 
further held that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. See, 
e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents . . . .”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923). A parent has 
“fundamental liberty interests” in maintaining the parent-child relationship. Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). This includes the right of parents 
to use “reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior.” State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 
444, 449 (Me. 2000). 
The same justification is recognized in Canada. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 
C-46, § 43 (1985) (affirming the justification for the use of force by parents and 
schoolteachers against children under their care, provided that “the force does not exceed 
what is reasonable under the circumstances”); see also Canadian Found. for Children v. 
Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (Can.) (affirming that this justification is consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice); Ogg-Moss v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 173 (Can.) 
(affirming that because the justification found in section 43 effectively removes from 
children the right to be free from unconsented invasions of physical security or dignity 
normally protected by the criminal law, it should only be extended to those who undertake 
the responsibilities and obligations associated with being a parent). In England, it has long 
been recognized at common law that the reasonable use of force by a parent for the purpose 
of disciplining a child is justified. Moreover, this defense has been extended to anyone 
standing in loco parentis. See, e.g., R. v. Hopley, (1860) 175 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B.); R. v. 
Smith, (1985) 82 Law Soc. Gaz. 198 (C.A.) (Eng.). The reasonableness of any such force will 
depend on such matters as physical and mental consequences for the child, the age and 
personal characteristics of the child, whether an external instrument was used, or whether 
marks were left on the child’s body. See R. v. H., (2002) 1 Crim. App. 59 (A.C.) (Eng.). The 
defense has recently been limited by legislation. In England, the Children Act denies the 
justification for: wounding and causing grievous bodily harm; assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm; and cruelty to persons under sixteen. See Children Act, 2004, c. 31, § 58 (Eng.). 
The effect of the provision is that reasonable and proportionate punishment that amounts to 
simple assault or battery, and does not involve cruelty, is still protected by the defense of 
lawful chastisement. 
27.  See infra Subsection II.B.1. 
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border police, they are not automatically permitted to do so. Even though they 
might be engaging in precisely the same conduct that would be justified if 
undertaken by border police, there are still situations where they are rightly 
branded as criminals for doing it.28 This is because the justification provisions 
in criminal codes do not set out general permissions to engage in socially 
worthwhile conduct, however that conduct might be defined; rather, 
justification defenses recognize that some people (but not others) have the legal 
power to make such a decision.29 
Although this element of decision-making power is a crucial feature of 
justification defenses, it is far less well recognized than the first two.30 Indeed, 
at one point, George Fletcher seemed to deny the importance of decision 
making altogether. As he wrote: “Claims of justification lend themselves to 
universalization. That the doing is objectively right (or at least not wrongful) 
means that anyone is licensed to do it.”31 This widely shared view about the 
universality of justification is wrong in at least two distinct ways. First, it 
ignores the fact that only those who play the right legal role may be able to rely 
on justification defenses for engaging in the same behavior (for example, it is 
police officers, not Minutemen, who can detain illegal immigrants at the 
border). But second, it ignores the fact that only certain people have the legal 
power to decide when that conduct is justified (for example, it is usually the 
justice of the peace, not the police officer, who can decide when a search is 
justified). I shall return to this point—and provide further argument for the 
general importance of legal powers to all justifications—in Part II. 
 
28.  For more on these latter-day “Minutemen,” see Jim Gilchrist’s Minuteman Project, 
http://www.minutemanproject.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). See also Sarah Vowell, Op-
Ed., Lock and Load, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at A13 (describing modern Minutemen 
projects as “random guys with guns stalking Niagara Falls or the Rio Grande” and noting 
that President George W. Bush has condemned them as “vigilantes”). 
29.  As I shall argue below, this authorized person may in some cases be the very one who carries 
out the permitted conduct as well. See infra Section II.B.  
30.  Kent Greenawalt was one of the first to notice the crucial role of standing in justification 
defenses. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1897, 1915 (1984) (“Some justifications depend upon the social role of the actor or 
his relation to a person affected by the act. Police and parents, for example, have special 
authorizations to use physical force when others may not.”). Crucially, however, Greenawalt 
talks of the social role of the actor rather than the decision maker, whom I take to be central to 
the structure of justifications in criminal law. 
31.  GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 761-62 (1978) (emphasis added). 
1070.THORBURN.1130.DOC 4/22/2008 3:39:00 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1070  2008 
1086 
 
B. The Two Accounts 
Over the past thirty years, a debate has raged in criminal law theory 
between two accounts of justifications. Both accounts have rejected the 
thoroughgoing instrumentalism of generations past and have accepted that 
there is an important difference between justifications (which concern what 
conduct the law permits) and many other defenses such as excuses (which 
concern when we shall not be punished for doing what is prohibited). On one 
side, Paul Robinson has argued consistently for a utilitarian account of 
justifications: as a general rule, the law ought to permit anyone to do whatever 
prevents greater harm than it causes. But Robinson’s utilitarian account of 
justifications is unable to explain any of the three basic features just identified: 
he rejects the reasons requirement as incompatible with his utilitarian reading 
of the harm principle, he insists that justifications should be subject to a fault 
standard of correctness, and he fails to consider the importance of decision-
making powers. On the other side, Fletcher and Gardner have consistently 
rejected Robinson’s utilitarianism in favor of a view focused on the structure of 
practical reasoning. But even they are unable to account for two of the three 
basic features of justifications just identified: first, they too reject the 
reasonable belief standard for justifications, and second, they simply do not 
consider the importance of decision making. 
1. Robinson’s Challenge 
Paul Robinson has consistently argued for the reform of justification 
defenses in Anglo-American law because they do not fit his favored moral 
theory of justification.32 Although he has written extensively on matters of 
structure and function in criminal law,33 he does not pay close attention to the 
institutional division of labor in this area of criminal law doctrine. When it 
comes to justification defenses, he assumes that they, like prohibitions, are part 
of the general rules of conduct for citizens set down by the legislature.34 
 
32.  In a paper coauthored with John M. Darley, Robinson suggests that most people’s 
intuitions favor his “deeds” account of justifications rather than the traditional common law 
“reasons” account. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist vs. Subjectivist Views 
of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 409 (1998). 
33.  See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW (1997). 
34.  Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM AND 
CULPABILITY, supra note 21, at 45, 48 (“[A] ‘deeds’ theory of justification . . . allows the law to 
better communicate to the public the conduct rules that it commands they follow.”). Antony 
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Nevertheless, he insists that the question of whether or not a particular act is 
justified can only be answered ex post by the courts. As a result, he argues that 
Anglo-American criminal law should abandon its traditional fault standard of 
reasonable belief for justifications.35 Further, he argues that justification 
defenses should be subject to his (very controversial) utilitarian interpretation 
of the harm principle, according to which the state may only prohibit 
individuals from doing things that cause more harm than they prevent.36 
When we cause harm to prevent a greater evil, Robinson argues, “due to the 
special circumstances of the situation, no harm has in fact occurred.”37 Any 
extension of the criminal sanction to such harmless conduct, he argues, is 
illegitimate.38 Since justifications, along with criminal prohibitions, set the 
boundary between permissible and criminally prohibited conduct,39 
Robinson’s argument would require that we deem all conduct that prevents 
more harm than it causes “justified.” 
Building on these normative foundations, Robinson then suggests that 
much of present-day criminal law doctrine is best understood as a not entirely 
successful attempt to live up to the demands of the harm principle as he 
understands it. Following Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael,40 Robinson 
claims that criminal law prohibitions and justification defenses are mechanisms 
by which the law attempts to identify conduct that causes more harm than it 
prevents.41 Prohibitions do this in a more rough-and-ready fashion by simply 
 
Duff rightly points out that Robinson’s account effectively does away with justifications as a 
distinct category altogether. It is, he suggests, “not a theory of justification, as a criminal 
defence: it is a theory about where the distinction between offences and defences should be 
drawn, and holds that what ‘reasons’ theorists count as justificatory defences should rather 
be counted as factors that negate an element of the offence.” R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR 
CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 280 (2007). 
35.  Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 239-
40 (1982) (“A mistake as to justification is by its nature necessarily an excuse, not a 
justification.”). 
36.  Robinson, supra note 14, at 268. For a strong critique of Robinson’s reading of the harm 
principle, see Gardner, supra note 21, at 126-29. Gardner’s account is based on an argument 
by Joseph Raz. See Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in ISSUES IN 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 313 (Ruth Gavison 
ed., 1987). 
37.  Robinson, supra note 14, at 272 (emphasis added). 
38.  Id. at 267-68. 
39.  Id.; see also Robinson, supra note 34. 
40.  Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 
701 (1937). 
41.  Paul H. Robinson, In Defense of the Model Penal Code: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 2 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 25, 39-40 (1998). 
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banning whole classes of conduct because they tend to cause more harm than 
they prevent; justifications do this in a more nuanced way, allowing for the 
balancing of evils in the particular case.42 This utilitarian balancing structure is 
most evident in the “lesser evils” defense, which dominates the Model Penal 
Code’s account of justification.43 But, he argues, this utilitarian balancing 
structure is also in evidence in many other justification defenses: police officers 
are entitled to effect lawful arrests where the harm caused by the officer’s 
assault is less than the harm of allowing criminal suspects to evade justice;44 
citizens are entitled to kill in self-defense where the harm of killing the attacker 
is less than the harm of allowing the object of the attack to be killed; and so 
on.45 
Finally, Robinson applies these principles to contemporary criminal law 
doctrine—specifically, to the “reasons requirement” that is a central part of the 
law of justifications throughout the English-speaking world. The traditional 
reasons requirement, he points out, ensures that some people whose conduct 
clearly prevents more harm than it causes will still be subject to criminal 
sanction. For example, someone who steals a bag purely for selfish gain but 
who later finds a bomb in it (which would almost certainly have killed many 
people had he not stolen it) and turns it in to the police is not entitled to a 
justification of lesser evils for his theft because he did not take the bag for the 
 
42.  According to this account, criminal prohibitions simply function as what Fred Schauer calls 
“rules of thumb.” See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 4 (1991). 
43.  Indeed, the Model Penal Code simply calls their choice of evils defense “justification 
generally.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). 
44.  See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly force to 
prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon is permissible only when 
necessary to prevent the escape and when the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others). 
Similarly, the Canadian Criminal Code authorizes the use of force in preventing a breach of 
the peace so long as the actor “uses no more force than is reasonably necessary to prevent the 
continuance or renewal of the breach of the peace or than is reasonably proportioned to the 
danger to be apprehended from the continuance or renewal of the breach of the peace.” 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 30 (1985). 
45.  The Model Penal Code makes the same suggestion in its discussion of justification defenses 
generally. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) (providing that, in evaluating whether the 
“Use of Force in Self-Protection” is justifiable, the use of force must be balanced against the 
unlawful act being committed, and the actor must believe that the force used is necessary to 
protect himself from death or serious bodily harm. The defense will be denied if the actor 
knows he can avoid the use of force with complete safety by retreating or surrendering 
possession of property). 
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right reasons.46 This, Robinson claims, violates the harm-minimization 
principle because it subjects an individual to criminal sanction even though he 
prevented much greater harm than he caused. Accordingly, he advocates for 
the elimination of the reasons requirement altogether.47 He calls his favored 
model, which has no reasons requirement, a “deeds” account of justifications 
(though it might more accurately be called an “outcomes” account), as opposed 
to the orthodox “reasons” account.48 
In sum, then, Paul Robinson is quite frank about his inability to explain 
why justification defenses have the structure that they do in present Anglo-
American criminal law doctrine. Indeed, he suggests that the law applies a 
reasons requirement to justification defenses simply because it has confused 
the appropriate requirements for excuses (which also bear a reasons 
requirement) and justifications.49 The proper basis upon which the law should 
exempt conduct from criminal prohibition, he argues, is that it prevents more 
harm than it causes. Anything that runs counter to this rationale (such as the 
reasons requirement) should be eliminated.50 
2. Fletcher and Gardner’s Response 
Over the years, George Fletcher and John Gardner51 have attacked the 
specifics of Robinson’s revisionist account of justifications on numerous 
occasions, particularly its insistence on doing away with the reasons 
requirement.52 Whereas Robinson assumes that courts should consider 
conduct to be justified whenever it prevents more harm than it causes, Fletcher 
and Gardner insist that the concept of justification is too complex to be fully 
 
46.  This example is taken from the actual case of Motti Ashkenazi. See Paul H. Robinson, The 
Bomb Thief and the Theory of Justification Defenses, 8 CRIM. L.F. 387, 387-90 (1997). 
47.  Id. at 407-09. 
48.  Robinson, supra note 34, at 48. 
49.  Robinson, supra note 14, at 274-79. 
50.  Id. at 292. 
51.  It is hard to say that George Fletcher and John Gardner defend precisely the same account. 
Gardner’s position is—quite explicitly—a retelling of Fletcher’s with considerable 
emendations and new foundations in Joseph Raz’s theories of authority and practical 
reasoning. In my retelling, I elide some of the differences between the two accounts for the 
sake of brevity. For more on the relationship between Fletcher’s and Gardner’s positions, see 
John Gardner, Fletcher on Offences and Defences, 39 TULSA L. REV. 817 (2004). 
52.  Gardner cites Kenneth Campbell as a major inspiration for the underpinnings of this view. 
See Gardner, supra note 21, at 107 n.8 (citing Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in 
CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE 73 (I.H. Dennis ed., 1987)). 
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explained by Robinson’s harm-minimization principle. Although they provide 
a subtle and, in many ways, convincing account of the concept of justification 
in practical reasoning, Fletcher and Gardner are not much closer than 
Robinson to being able to explain the structure of contemporary Anglo-
American criminal law doctrine. And this is because they, too, have mistaken 
the proper institutional place of justification defenses. 
Fletcher and Gardner begin their account of justifications in the same place 
as Robinson, with the observation that justifications are part of the criminal 
law’s rules of conduct—rules that tell us what is, and what is not, permitted. 
And, like Robinson, Fletcher and Gardner insist that the question of whether 
or not a particular act is justified can only be answered ex post by the courts.53 
But unlike Robinson, they insist that courts should not deem conduct to be 
justified simply by balancing the harms it causes and averts. Whereas 
Robinson would assert that justified wrongdoing is on a moral par with 
ordinary, permitted conduct (for neither type of act causes more harm than it 
prevents), Fletcher and Gardner insist that there is a radical moral difference 
between the two: ordinary, permitted conduct is usually unobjectionable, they 
argue, but justified wrongdoing, while permissible, is nonetheless morally 
conflicted. Indeed, as Fletcher has argued, when we violate a prohibition and 
invade another’s rights, “even if the right is trumped or overridden [by a 
justification], we should retain a certain sense of loss in witnessing the 
overriding of the right.”54 It is this element of moral conflict, both he and 
Gardner argue, that gives justification defenses their distinctive flavor. They 
thus argue that if we wish to understand why the criminal law is structured in 
terms of (ex ante, legislated) prohibitions and (ex post, court-controlled) 
justifications, we should put aside utilitarian assumptions that there is a 
formula that can simultaneously determine what is wrongful, what is justified, 
and what is prohibited. Once we do so, they suggest, we will be able to make 
sense of the particular function played by justification defenses.55 
The fact is, Fletcher and Gardner insist, the structure of criminal law is 
complex because the structure of the underlying moral norms is itself complex. 
In criminal law, and everywhere else, the concept of wrongdoing is more basic 
than concepts of justification or prohibition. Fletcher and Gardner argue that if 
there are strong moral reasons not to do something, then it is appropriate to 
 
53.  It is this sense of “decision rule” that Fletcher is referring to when he states that 
justifications “function, it seems, as decision rules rather than conduct rules.” See Fletcher, 
supra note 17, at 180. 
54.  George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 978 (1985). 
55.  JOHN GARDNER, In Defence of Defences, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 77, 77-82 (2007).  
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say that it is wrong to do it. The legislature reflects this fact by telling us to 
disregard any reasons—by providing what Gardner, following Joseph Raz, 
calls “exclusionary reasons”56—we might have to engage in such wrongful 
conduct. Criminal offense definitions, they say, provide exclusionary reasons 
not to consider any reasons for engaging in certain sorts of conduct. Once we 
establish the scope of wrongdoing through offense definitions, however, we 
still have not determined what conduct should be prohibited, all things 
considered, since there are many situations where an individual might still be 
justified in doing a real wrong.57 For example, even though there are always 
good reasons not to kill another person (and therefore, they suggest, it is 
always wrong to do so), there are strong countervailing reasons why we should 
nevertheless be permitted to do so in situations of legitimate self-defense. The 
class of permitted conduct, then, includes not only nonwrongful conduct but 
also justified wrongdoing. The reason why we say that killing in self-defense is 
justified wrongdoing—rather than saying that it is not wrong at all—is that the 
reasons against killing, though outweighed, still exist and still have force. 
The law’s focus on the justified actor’s reasons for action, Fletcher and 
Gardner argue, comes from this complex interplay of wrongdoing, 
justification, and prohibition. Although we are permitted to engage in 
wrongdoing under certain circumstances, they argue, we are allowed to do so 
only if we can show the court ex post facto that our conduct was in fact 
justified, all things considered. And this means not only that our conduct was 
justifiable—that is, that there were good reasons for someone to have done it in 
the circumstances—but that we were in fact justified in doing it under the 
circumstances. Therefore, there must not only have been good reason for us to 
have violated the prohibition as we did, but also this good reason must have 
been our reason for action at the time. Only if both of these sorts of reasons are 
present—what Gardner calls “guiding reasons” and “explanatory reasons”58—is 
our conduct in fact justified. 
Fletcher’s and Gardner’s account is thus able to offer an explanation for 
why the reasons for action matter by means of their sophisticated account of 
justification in practical reasoning. But their account forces them to reject 
another core feature of justifications: their distinctive fault standard. Fletcher 
and Gardner’s insistence that we are entitled to a justification only where there 
 
56.  Gardner, supra note 51, at 822 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 191 (2d 
ed. 1999)). 
57.  Gardner, in particular, puts great emphasis on the claim that justified wrongdoing is really 
wrong, even though justified—not just prima facie wrong. See Gardner, supra note 51, at 78. 
58.  Gardner, supra note 21, at 103 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (2d ed. 
1999)). 
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were both good reasons to act as we did (guiding reasons) and where we acted 
for those reasons (explanatory reasons) leads them to conclude with Robinson 
that justification defenses should always be subject to a fault standard of 
correctness, rather than of reasonable belief. As Fletcher puts it, 
“[j]ustification—harmony with the Right—is an objective phenomenon. Mere 
belief cannot generate a justification, however reasonable the belief might 
be.”59 But this conclusion is starkly at odds with settled doctrine: it would 
represent a seismic shift in the structure of criminal law if police officers were 
only held to be justified in making an arrest if they were correct in their belief 
that there was good reason to do so (rather than merely having reasonable and 
probable grounds for believing this), or if parents were only justified in 
disciplining their children if they were correct in their belief that disciplinary 
force was in their child’s best interest in the particular case (rather that just 
having good reason to believe that this was so), and so on.60 As Kent 
Greenawalt has pointed out, “[I]n the common law, it is universally said that 
police are justified in making arrests based on probable cause. . . . No one of 
whom I am aware has asserted that police are really only ‘excused’ in these 
situations.”61 
It is because they focus directly on the court’s evaluation of the conduct ex 
post facto that Fletcher and Gardner, like Robinson, assume that the fault 
standard for justifications should be one of correctness. Courts should find that 
the conduct was genuinely justified, they assume, only if they determine that 
there was in fact good reason to do it. But if they were to focus instead, as I 
shall, on the intervening decision—the ex ante exercise of a legal power judging 
the conduct to be justified—they would see why a fault standard of reasonable 
belief is appropriate. It is only possible for the decision maker to determine 
whether conduct is justified in the circumstances based on the evidence 
available to him at the time. So long as there are reasonable and probable 
grounds to find that the conduct is justified, he should so find—and once this 
decision has been validly made, this renders the conduct justified for the 
purposes of criminal law. 
In short, although Fletcher and Gardner are able to offer an explanation for 
the importance of the law’s reasons requirement for justifications, their failure 
 
59.  Fletcher, supra note 54, at 972. 
60.  Id. at 973 (“American legislatures routinely equate reasonable belief in the existence of a 
justification with the actual existence of the justification.”). 
61.  Kent Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, 17 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 14, 23 (1998). For a thoughtful and careful critique of Gardner’s failure 
to explain the fault standard of reasonable belief for justifications, see Hamish Stewart, The 
Role of Reasonableness in Self-Defence, 14 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 317 (2003). 
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to recognize the place of decision-making powers still leaves them unable to 
explain the fault standard of reasonable belief. And in the end, they are almost 
as sharply at odds with Anglo-American criminal law doctrine as Robinson. 
Nevertheless, this examination of precisely how and why both the 
Fletcher/Gardner and the Robinson approaches failed points the way toward 
another, more promising account. 
C. The Beginnings of a New Account: The Power To Decide 
The two accounts of justifications that have dominated the theoretical 
debate over the past thirty years make similar mistakes about the institutional 
place of justification defenses in criminal law. Whereas Robinson rejects both 
the fault standard of reasonable belief and the reasons requirement for 
justifications, Fletcher and Gardner are able to explain the reasons 
requirement, but they are still unable to explain the fault standard of 
reasonable belief. In addition to these problems, however, both accounts are 
guilty of an even more serious failing, for neither of them can explain perhaps 
the most important feature of justification defenses: their deep connection to 
the power of certain individuals to make authoritative decisions about when 
they are justified to do what the criminal law generally prohibits. 
Robinson’s account, focused as it is on the minimization of harm, is unable 
to make any sense of the criminal law’s focus on this power of certain legal 
actors to decide when otherwise prohibited conduct is justified. His account 
focuses exclusively on the consequences of particular acts, leaving no 
conceptual room for considerations of whose job it is to decide what conduct is 
legally justified. He cannot explain in anything but an ad hoc fashion why the 
law insists that police officers who have reasonable and probable grounds for a 
search should ever have to seek the say-so of a justice of the peace before 
proceeding62 or why citizens should be entitled to do more when authorized by 
 
62.  In the United States, a warrantless search is constitutionally suspect under the Fourth 
Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[T]he police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant 
procedure.”). Despite this general principle, however, U.S. courts have recently deemed 
constitutional a wide variety of warrantless searches. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a federal magistrate may issue a warrant based on information communicated by 
telephone or other appropriate means, including by fax. There is no general policy of 
avoiding the use of such warrants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(3)(A); see also United States v. 
Jones, 696 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming issuance of such a warrant). 
In Canadian law, there is a presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable and 
therefore a violation of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See 
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.) (holding that section 8 of the Canadian 
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a peace officer than they may when acting on their own.63 In all these cases and 
many more, the criminal law recognizes actors as justified only when the 
appropriate decision maker has exercised a legal power determining that their 
conduct is permissible. Any account of justifications that leaves this crucial 
element out of the mix is surely doomed to fail. 
Fletcher and Gardner’s position is no less vulnerable than Robinson’s to a 
similar critique. Although they do not share his consequentialist assumption 
that justification defenses are designed to save all harm-minimizing conduct 
from criminal sanction, they too are unable to account for the crucial role of 
decision-making power in the structure of justifications. But as I shall argue, 
conduct is legally justified only if the appropriate person validly decides that it is 
justified. The mere fact that there are good reasons to engage in certain 
conduct is not enough to justify it, even if they are the actor’s reasons for 
action. The appropriate decision maker must consider those reasons and make 
an authoritative decision on the matter before we can say that the conduct is in 
fact legally justified. 
ii. justifications and the power to decide 
In this Part, I present an alternative account of justifications that 
emphasizes an aspect of the criminal law that has hitherto been largely ignored. 
I suggest that while legislative provisions and common law rules concerning 
justifications are ultimately concerned with regulating individual conduct, they 
do not do so by prohibiting and permitting conduct directly. Instead, they do 
so indirectly, by recognizing that certain individuals have the legal power to 
decide when it is justified to engage in conduct that is generally prohibited. Put 
another way, I argue that we cannot make sense of justification defenses simply 
as part of what H.L.A. Hart called the law’s “duty-imposing rules”—rules that 
relieve us of certain duties imposed by criminal prohibitions. Instead, to 
 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires prior authorization in the form of a warrant, 
except where obtaining a warrant is not feasible). There are very few exceptions to the 
presumption of unreasonableness; a warrantless search may be upheld if it is exercised in 
exigent circumstances, see Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.); Eccles v. 
Bourque, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739 (Can.), or as incident to arrest, see R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 51 (Can.); Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (Can.). But these powers have 
been limited by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Situations in 
which police officers may arrest without a warrant are similarly limited. The Canadian 
Criminal Code also codifies a procedure through which police officers may request warrants 
by phone where it is impractical to appear in person before a justice of the peace. See Canada 
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 487.01 (West 2008). 
63.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
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understand justifications, we must look—as Hart does—beyond those rules to 
an additional set of guidelines, what Hart terms “authority-conferring rules,” 
which recognize that certain individuals have legal powers to change legal 
relations simply as a result of their valid decision to do so.64 
A. Legal Powers, Decision Rules, and Conduct Rules 
At the root of both the Robinson and the Fletcher/Gardner models of 
justifications is the same basic assumption about the sorts of legal rules that are 
at work in the criminal law. Meir Dan-Cohen sets out this basic assumption 
most clearly in one of the best-known articles in recent criminal law theory.65 
The legal rules at work in the criminal law, Dan-Cohen suggests, can be 
divided neatly into two groups, which he calls “decision rules” and “conduct 
rules,” based on their subject matter and the audience to whom they are 
directed.66 Whereas conduct rules are addressed to ordinary citizens and 
concern what conduct those citizens are and are not permitted to do, decision 
rules are addressed to state officials and concern how those officials should 
exercise their decision-making powers over citizens. 
Some rules can fairly intuitively be placed into one category or another. 
Criminal offense definitions,67 for example, clearly seem to be addressed to 
citizens and concern what conduct they are and are not permitted to do. 
Accordingly, basic rule-of-law concerns about fair notice to citizens are crucial 
here—for it is only fair to hold someone responsible for violating a rule of 
conduct if the rule has been made available to him. Excuse defenses such as 
duress, however, seem to be the result of decision rules.68 It is implausible, 
Dan-Cohen points out, to think of these defenses as rules addressed to citizens, 
permitting them to commit criminal offenses so long as they do so under 
 
64.  HART, supra note 15, at 39. 
65.  Of course, because Dan-Cohen’s article only appeared in 1984 (many years after both 
Robinson and Fletcher set out their initial positions), I do not mean to suggest that the 
article itself informed the original formulations of their positions from the 1970s. Rather, I 
suggest only that he made explicit assumptions that underlie both of their positions. This 
seems plain from the fact that Robinson and Fletcher both use Dan-Cohen’s language of 
“conduct rules” and “decision rules” in their post-1984 discussions. See Fletcher, supra note 
17; Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 
(1990). 
66.  Dan-Cohen, supra note 15, at 627. This distinction follows the structure of Hart’s 
distinction. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
67.  Dan-Cohen, supra note 15, at 648-50 (distinguishing between prohibitions—which serve as 
conduct rules—and some fault standards, which he believes function as decision rules). 
68.  Id. at 632-34. 
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duress. Rather, it makes better sense to say that the law instructs officials to 
excuse individuals who have committed offenses under duress. And since 
decision rules apply directly to officials, we should be less concerned to give 
notice of these rules to citizens and more concerned to give clear guidance to 
the relevant officials on precisely what these rules require them to do. 
A court should proceed quite differently when faced with each of these two 
sorts of rules. When a court faces a decision rule such as whether to excuse the 
accused on grounds of duress, its task is very straightforward: simply follow the 
decision rule that tells it when to grant an excuse and when not to. There is a 
more complex interplay of rules at work when courts confront a conduct rule 
such as a criminal offense definition. Here, the court must (1) follow decision 
rules that instruct it in how it should (2) use a conduct rule as a yardstick by 
which to determine whether the actor violated that conduct rule. 
Dan-Cohen’s neat distinction between these two sorts of rules seems to 
animate both the Robinson and the Fletcher/Gardner models of justifications, 
but in a rather surprising fashion. On the one hand, all three agree that the 
subject matter of justifications is typical of conduct rules (for they all insist that 
justifications concern what citizens may and may not do). On the other hand, 
they all insist that justifications are addressed to courts, rather than to citizens 
(for they say that it is up to courts to determine what conduct is justified, ex 
post facto, based on a standard of correctness). So do they conclude that 
justifications are conduct rules or decision rules? George Fletcher’s answer to 
this question has changed depending on the context.69 When the focus of 
discussion was on the subject matter of justifications, he asserted that “the 
criteria of justification are supposed to function not only ex post as decision 
rules, but ex ante as conduct rules.”70 But when the focus was on the 
appropriate fault standard for justifications, he asserted that justifications 
“function, it seems, as decision rules rather than conduct rules.”71 Although 
Robinson and Gardner have not been as explicit in stating their equivocation 
on this issue, it seems that they are committed to following Fletcher on this 
point. 
On my account, justification defenses can be fit into Dan-Cohen’s 
conceptual apparatus of conduct rules and decision rules, but we must be very 
careful to find their proper place. While ordinary conduct rules, such as 
criminal prohibitions, are created by legislation ex ante, and ordinary decision 
 
69.  Mitch Berman points out this apparent contradiction in Fletcher’s views. See Berman, supra 
note 8, at 37. 
70.  Fletcher, supra note 54, at 976. 
71.  Fletcher, supra note 17, at 180. 
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rules, such as those concerning excuses or denials of responsibility, govern the 
exercise of judicial decision making ex post, justification defenses seem to 
crystallize at some point in the middle. That is, a justification consists of both 
(a) a decision rule guiding the relevant decision maker’s determination that a 
particular course of conduct is or is not justified under the circumstances; and 
(b) a resulting conduct rule telling the relevant actors that they are entitled to 
do what that decision maker validly held to be justified. 
When a court is faced with a claim of justification, then, it is not easy to 
explain the nature of its task in terms of Dan-Cohen’s decision rule/conduct 
rule dichotomy. The court’s task is not a simple one-step process of following a 
decision rule, nor is it even a two-step process of following a decision rule 
instructing it to use a conduct rule to evaluate an actor’s conduct. Rather, the 
court must follow a three-step process of reviewing the underlying decision 
making. According to this procedure, the court (1) follows a decision rule 
instructing it to (2) evaluate the decision of another decision maker concerning 
(3) what conduct was justified in the circumstances. That is, the court should 
not just use a conduct rule to evaluate the actor’s conduct directly. Instead, it 
should evaluate the intervening decision (by asking whether the decision 
maker was within her jurisdiction in making the decision, or whether she drew 
a reasonable conclusion based on appropriate consideration of the relevant 
factors), and if it finds that the decision was valid, it should simply defer to 
that decision, whether or not it would have decided in the same way itself. 
So, should we call justification defenses “conduct rules,” then, or “decision 
rules”? It might be best to avoid this language altogether and to keep in mind 
that things are rather more complicated.72 
B. Three Types of Decision Makers, Three Types of Justifications 
So far, we have noted that at least some important justification defenses 
arise from the exercise of a legal power by authoritative decision makers. But 
do all justification defenses in Anglo-American criminal law fit this general 
pattern? In this Section, I will consider somewhat more systematically the 
broad sweep of justification defenses in Anglo-American criminal law to 
confirm that this model presents the most plausible account of generally 
recognized justification defenses. 
 
72.  Several administrative law scholars have commented on the inability of the conduct 
rule/decision rule dichotomy to describe the place of administrative agencies exercising 
delegated decision-making authority. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989). 
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I organize my review of justification defenses by separating them into three 
distinct groups according to the sort of relationship that exists between the 
decision maker and the party whose interests are subject to the decision. The 
first group consists of justifications where the decision maker owes a fiduciary 
duty toward the party whose interests are subject to her decision. Justifications 
in this group arise from such exercises of legal power as a parent’s decision to 
use disciplinary force on his child, a doctor’s decision to operate on an 
unconscious patient, and a ship captain’s decision to jettison passenger 
property in a storm. 
The second group comprises those justifications where the decision maker 
is a state official and the party whose interests are subject to the decision is one 
or more ordinary citizens. Justifications in this group arise from exercises of 
legal power such as the decision of a justice of the peace to authorize a police 
search, the decision of a court to authorize a corrections official to impose 
punishment, and the decision of a firefighter that the destruction of property is 
justified to help quell a blaze. 
Finally, the third group of justifications includes those where both the 
decision maker and the person whose interests are subject to the decision are 
ordinary citizens. Examples of this third category include the decision of a 
citizen that she is justified in killing in self-defense, the decision that she is 
justified in causing a “lesser evil” to avoid a greater one, or the decision that she 
is justified in performing a citizen’s arrest. 
1. Private Fiduciaries 
The most neglected category of justification defenses in recent debates is 
made up of those that arise from the exercise of a legal power by a private 
fiduciary.73 George Fletcher simply leaves them out of his taxonomy of 
justifications altogether,74 and Paul Robinson assimilates them into the quite 
different class of “public authority” justifications.75 When we look closely, 
 
73.  Ernest Weinrib explains the basic structure of the fiduciary relation as follows: “Two 
elements thus form the core of the fiduciary concept and these elements can also serve to 
delineate its frontiers. First, the fiduciary must have scope for the exercise of discretion, and, 
second, this discretion must be capable of affecting the legal position of the principal.” 
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975). For a very 
thoughtful and subtle investigation of the fiduciary relation and its role in private law, see 
Paul Baron Miller, Essays Toward a Theory of Fiduciary Law (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Toronto) (on file with The Yale Law Journal). 
74.  FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 770-98. 
75.  Robinson, supra note 35, at 218-19.  
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however, we find that they make up an important and distinct class of 
justification defenses. There are a great many occasions where the criminal law 
treats individuals as justified in interfering with a certain individual’s rights 
because the person standing in the position of fiduciary to that rights-holder 
has decided that it is justified to interfere in that way. The trouble is that most 
commentators either explain these justifications in a way that conceals the 
crucial role of decision by the fiduciary, or they ignore them altogether.76 
The justification of disciplinary force that is open to parents and those 
acting in loco parentis is well known, but it is usually explained in a way that 
ignores the crucial role of decision-making power. Paul Robinson’s treatment 
is typical in this respect. He explains the general structure of justification 
defenses in the following way, leaving out any role for decision making: “All 
justifications have the same internal structure: triggering conditions permit a 
necessary and proportional response. The triggering conditions are the 
circumstances which must exist before the actor will be eligible to act under a 
justification.”77 According to this way of thinking, parental use of disciplinary 
force can be explained without recourse to the exercise of decision-making 
power. Rather, under this view, when a child behaves in a manner that merits 
the use of disciplinary force, that conduct serves as a “triggering condition” 
that permits a necessary and proportional response. When we think of the use 
of disciplinary force in this way, justifications seem to operate as simple 
exceptions to the general prohibition against the use of force.78 But such a view 
seems to suggest that the law somehow affords less protection to children from 
their parents than it does to ordinary citizens, for under this theory, parents 
appear to be subject to fewer prohibitions concerning the use of force toward 
their children than they are toward total strangers. This view seems jarring, 
 
76.  Andrew Ashworth is one important exception to this tendency. Although he suggests that 
the rationale for this justification of disciplinary force may reside in some form of delegation 
by the state of its power to punish, he also points out that it might also have an independent 
basis in the parent’s power to determine, within limits, what is in the “best interests” of the 
child. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 150 (5th ed. 2006). 
77.  Robinson, supra note 35, at 216. 
78.  Indeed, it is not surprising that Robinson, who sees justifications as simple permissions 
arising from “triggering conditions,” also seeks to do away with the reasons requirement. 
For so long as the proper conditions existed and our response was a necessary and 
proportionate response, why should it matter what our reasons for action were? As I shall 
explore in greater detail in Subsection II.B.3 below, the element of decision is most 
consistent with the reasons requirement through justification defenses. 
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however, in light of the fact that parents generally owe greater duties to their 
children than they do to strangers.79 
A better way to understand the justification of disciplinary force that is 
available to parents is to think of it as arising from the exercise of decision-
making power by parents over their children. That is, just as we recognize that 
parents have the legal power to decide their child’s name and may make 
decisions about the disposition of their child’s property,80 they may also decide 
when it is appropriate to use otherwise prohibited force to discipline the child. 
The parent is not just someone who is sometimes relieved of the law’s 
prohibitions against violence. Rather, the parent is someone whom the law 
entrusts with important decisions about the child’s welfare—and sometimes 
the exercise of that decision-making power results in a determination that the 
use of disciplinary force toward the child is justified in the circumstances. It is 
the parent’s valid exercise of her legal power over her child’s person and 
interests—deciding that her use of force on her child is appropriate in the 
circumstances—that renders that conduct lawful. 
When we look more closely, we find that there are a great many 
justification defenses that arise from the exercise of legal powers by fiduciaries 
over beneficiaries. Unlike the parental justification of disciplinary force, 
however, most of these justification defenses are simply ignored altogether by 
criminal law scholars. Fiduciary relationships arise between parent and child by 
operation of law,81 but there are a great many other fiduciary relationships that 
arise either through unilateral undertaking82 or by agreement.83 For example, it 
is by unilateral undertaking that doctors who provide emergency medical 
treatment enter into a fiduciary relationship with their patients. By contrast, it 
is by means of bilateral agreement that doctors and patients (in nonemergency 
 
79.  The law imposes a great many positive obligations on private fiduciaries that it does not 
impose on others. For example, parents owe a positive obligation to their children and to 
their spouse to provide them with the necessities of life. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-
46, § 215 (1985) (Can.); Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1999). 
80.  1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 114-15 (Peter Birks ed., 2000). 
81.  See, e.g., M. (K.) v. M. (H.), 3 S.C.R. 6, 10 (1992) (Can.) (“The relationship between parent 
and child is fiduciary in nature . . . .”). 
82.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson suggested that the paradigmatic fiduciary relationship is 
established “where one party, A, has assumed to act in relation to the property or affairs of 
another, B.” White v. Jones, (1995) 2 A.C. 207, 271 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
83.  Although this agreement might exist within a contract, it need not do so. See Stone v. Davis, 
419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) (“A fiduciary relationship need not be created by 
contract; it may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties understand that a 
special trust or confidence has been reposed.” (citation omitted)). 
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circumstances), lawyers and clients, captains and passengers of a ship,84 settlers 
of a trust and trustee, and directors and shareholders of a corporation enter 
into fiduciary relationships.85 
In all these cases, the criminal law treats conduct that would otherwise be 
criminal as justified because of the exercise of legal power by the relevant 
decision maker: doctors who are unable to obtain consent from their patients 
(whether because they are unconscious or for other reasons) are still justified in 
interfering with a patient’s bodily integrity without consent insofar as this 
follows from their decision that a particular medical procedure would be 
justified;86 similarly, a lawyer is entitled to interfere with the financial affairs of 
his client so long as he has the appropriate power of attorney over those assets 
and he is acting pursuant to his decision that his conduct is in his client’s best 
interests; and so on. 
The independent significance of legal powers in the structure of these 
justifications is most clearly evident in situations where the person exercising 
 
84.  See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (“The 
sailors and passengers, in fact, cannot be regarded as in equal positions. The sailor (to use 
the language of a distinguished writer) owes more benevolence to another than to himself. 
He is bound to set a greater value on the life of others than on his own. And while we admit 
that sailor and sailor may lawfully struggle with each other for the plank which can save but 
one, we think that, if the passenger is on the plank, even “the law of necessity” justifies not 
the sailor who takes it from him.”). 
85.  Katz Corp. v. T.H. Canty & Co., 362 A.2d 975, 978-79 (Conn. 1975) (“An officer and 
director occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its stockholders.” (citation 
omitted)). 
86.  In the United States, the Model Penal Code provides that use of force by a doctor is justified 
in “an emergency when the actor believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted 
and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would 
consent.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(4) (1985). 
In Canada, the Ontario Health Care Consent Act states, “In deciding what the incapable 
person’s best interests are, the person who gives or refuses consent on his or her behalf shall 
take into consideration” the patient’s best interests. Ontario Health Care Consent Act of 
1996, S.O., ch. 2, sched. A, § 21(2) (1996) (Can.). The statute then provides several factors 
that ought to be weighed in determining “best interests,” id., and authorizes doctors to 
administer treatment without consent in an emergency and where “steps that are reasonable 
in the circumstances” have been taken to obtain consent, id. § 25(3)(c). In such an 
emergency, a health practitioner may administer treatment if the substitute decision maker 
fails to comply with section 21. See Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260 (Can. Nova Scotia 
Sup. Ct.) (holding that a surgeon may, in the course of an operation, take action he believes 
reasonably necessary to preserve the patient’s life or health).  
In the United Kingdom, a “best interests” defense of medical necessity has been 
developed through judge-made jurisprudence. See, e.g., R. v. Bournewood Cmty. & Mental 
Health NHS Trust, (1999) 1 A.C. 458 (H.L.) (Eng.); In re F., (1990) 2 A.C. 1 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
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the legal power is different from the person engaged in the justified conduct.87 
For example, although it is generally the ship’s captain who has the legal power 
to make decisions about what it is justified to do with her passengers’ property 
and persons in a storm, this does not mean she will herself carry out the 
justified conduct. Indeed, it will usually be her crew (once she has made her 
decision, of course) who jettison cargo or force passengers onto lifeboats. 
Similarly, an incompetent patient’s family members are usually the ones to 
exercise the legal power authorizing medical treatment88—but it is doctors, 
nurses, and other medical professionals who then administer the course of 
treatment. Once again, the crucial element in the justification of all such 
conduct is the valid decision by an authorized individual. 
This analysis, which puts the decision-making power over what conduct is 
justified at the center of our account of justifications, makes much better sense 
of the three basic structural features of justifications doctrine in all these cases 
than either the Robinson or the Fletcher/Gardner alternative. Unlike 
Robinson’s account, the argument put forth here explains the importance of 
the law’s reasons requirement for justifications by suggesting that it is the strict 
limits on the authorized person’s legal decision-making power that accounts 
for the importance of the actor’s reasons for action. Captains do not have 
unbridled discretion to authorize the jettisoning of cargo for any reason they 
wish. Rather, because of the fiduciary duty they owe their passengers, they 
only have the authority to exercise their powers in the best interests of their 
passengers. Accordingly, they are only authorized to permit specific acts that 
further the best interests of their passengers, such as saving the ship from 
 
87.  But Alon Harel argues that these two tasks may not always be separable. He suggests that 
there is an intrinsic relationship between the parental role and the imposition of sanctions 
just as there is an intrinsic relationship between the state’s role and the imposition of 
criminal punishment. In both cases, he argues, the decision maker should also be the one to 
impose the punishment. See Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Punish: On the Vices of 
Privately-Inflicted Sanctions for Wrongdoing, 14 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2008). 
88.  In some cases, however, parents’ exercise of decision-making power has been ruled invalid. 
This was the case in the famous English case of In re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation), [2001] Fam. 147 (A.C.) (Eng.). In that case, the hospital applied to the court to 
seek authorization, against the wishes of the parents, for a surgical procedure that would 
separate a pair of conjoined twins and would almost certainly lead to the death of one of 
them. Id. In a small number of cases, the court exercises the decision-making power over 
medical issues itself. See, for example, R. v. Bournewood Cmty. & Mental Health NHS Trust, 
(1999) 1 A.C. 458 (H.L.) (Eng.), where doctors sought leave of the court to sterilize a 
mentally incompetent but sexually active patient. 
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sinking.89 Similarly, parents do not have absolute discretion to decide to 
assault their children for any reason they like. The scope of their fiduciary duty 
toward their children means that they are authorized only to decide to do so for 
the purpose of disciplining their children. 
Second, unlike both Robinson’s view and the Fletcher/Gardner view, this 
account is also able to explain why justification defenses are subject to a fault 
standard of reasonable belief. Because justification defenses are always 
concerned with the exercise of a legal power, the fault standard that is of 
concern to us is the one that governs the exercise of that power. The parent’s 
decision to assault his child for the purpose of discipline must be reasonable 
based on all the facts available to him at the time of his decision. But we cannot 
ask that he be able to anticipate facts that only become available later, at the 
time of trial (as would be required by a correctness standard). The same is true 
of the captain’s decision to permit the jettisoning of cargo, the doctor’s decision 
to order emergency medical treatment, and so on. The net effect of all this is 
that so long as the authorizing party’s decision is based on reasonable beliefs 
about the relevant facts, then that person’s decision to permit the conduct is a 
valid one. 
2. Public Officials 
It is possible to make sense of justifications arising from the exercise of 
decision-making power by public officials in much the same way as those that 
arise from the decisions of private fiduciaries. In order to do so, however, we 
need to make a few minor adjustments to our analysis. Whereas private 
fiduciaries are only entitled to make decisions about justified interferences with 
the interests of their specific charges (parents over their children, family 
members over their incompetent relatives, or captains over their passengers), 
public officials are entitled to make decisions about when it is justified to 
interfere with the interests of many more people. Generally speaking, a justice 
of the peace may grant a search warrant over the property of anyone within his 
jurisdiction so long as there are appropriate grounds for doing so. And a police 
 
89.  Indeed, the duty of fiduciaries to treat all beneficiaries of the same class equally would also 
explain the court’s insistence on fair procedures for the determination of whom to throw 
overboard in Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 367. As the court put it: 
When . . . a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the hunger of others, 
the selection is by lot. This mode is resorted to as the fairest mode . . . for 
selection of the victim . . . . In no other than this or some like way are those 
having equal rights put upon an equal footing, and in no other way is it possible 
to guard against partiality . . . . 
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officer may determine that it is appropriate for him to arrest any person within 
his jurisdiction without a warrant under the appropriate circumstances. This 
second class of justification defenses, therefore, is still narrowly limited in the 
class of persons who may exercise the relevant legal power—specific state 
officials—but the class of persons whose interests are subject to that decision-
making power is considerably broader—usually including anyone within the 
decision maker’s jurisdiction.90 
Just as justification defenses claimed by private fiduciaries make it possible 
for them to carry out their fiduciary duties toward their charges, so justification 
defenses make it possible for public officials to carry out their official duties 
toward the citizenry. Indeed, without justification defenses, state officials 
would be quite unable to perform their most basic functions. Markus Dubber 
points out that from a different point of view, a list of police functions looks 
like a list of serious criminal offenses: 
The statutory threat of punishment looks suspiciously like “menacing,” 
wiretapping like “eavesdropping,” entrapment like “solicitation” (or 
even “conspiracy”), searching a suspect’s house like “trespass,” 
searching (or frisking) the suspect herself like “assault,” arresting her 
like “battery,” seizing her property like “larceny,” a drug bust like 
“possession of narcotics” (with or without intent to distribute), 
indicting—and convicting—a defendant like “defamation,” imprisoning 
the convict like “false imprisonment,” and executing her like 
“homicide” (“murder,” to be precise).91  
The way the law recognizes that police officers are entitled to effect arrests is to 
say they are justified in doing what would otherwise constitute an assault; they 
are entitled to search private places because they are justified in doing what 
would otherwise constitute a criminal trespass; they are entitled to engage in 
otherwise criminal conduct as part of a “sting” operation because they are 
justified in doing so; and so on. 
This parallel between justifications claimed by state officials and those 
claimed by private fiduciaries is somewhat surprising. Private fiduciaries are 
 
90.  These questions of jurisdiction quickly become complicated: although the person usually 
(but not always) must be present in the jurisdiction in order to be subject to the state 
official’s decision-making power, he often need not be a citizen of that country. For 
example, border guards may be permitted to apprehend illegal aliens, and police officers 
may be permitted to arrest noncitizen criminal suspects. 
91.  Markus Dirk Dubber, A Political Theory of Criminal Law: Autonomy and the Legitimacy of 
State Punishment 1-2 (Mar. 15, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=529522. 
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entitled to exercise legal powers over the interests of those in their charge, but 
they are bound by law to exercise those powers only for the benefit of those in 
their charge. State officials are similarly entitled to exercise legal powers only 
over those within their jurisdiction, but for the benefit of whom, exactly? 
Criminal law doctrine does not usually make explicit the interests that public 
officials must take into consideration when exercising these legal powers. 
Instead, most commonly, officials are simply granted the power to make 
particular decisions based on specific criteria: for example, they may permit an 
arrest where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the 
individual is guilty of an offense of sufficient seriousness.92 For now, I shall 
simply assert without arguing that the criminal law sets out these decision-
making powers in a way that may plausibly be interpreted as the expression of 
a quasi-fiduciary duty owed by public officials to the public at large (or to a 
particular sub-class of the public). I shall return to the question of the quasi-
fiduciary nature of the relationship that obtains between public officials and 
the citizenry in Part III. 
Once again, the crucial role of legal decision-making powers in these 
justifications is most obvious in those cases where there is a clear division of 
labor between those officials who exercise legal powers (such as a judge or a 
justice of the peace who grants search or arrest warrants) and those who carry 
out the justified conduct (such as the police officers who are armed with such 
warrants).93 In all these cases, the scope of the justification available to the 
actor is defined quite precisely by the terms of her warrant.94 In other cases, 
however, the division of labor is still present but not quite as obvious, such as 
when a junior police officer must defer to a senior officer’s judgment in making 
an arrest or conducting an investigation. Sometimes police officers have the 
power to decide what conduct ordinary citizens are justified in carrying out in 
order to deal with emergency situations.95 In all these cases, there is still a 
 
92.  See supra note 24.  
93.  Id. 
94.  See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) 
(“When an official search is properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance of 
a valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization.”). 
95.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(1) (1985) (authorizing the use of force to effect an arrest by 
the actor making or assisting in making that arrest); id. § 3.07(4) (authorizing the use of 
force by a private person assisting in an unlawful arrest); see also Canada Criminal Code, 
R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 25(1) (1985) (stating that everyone who is required or authorized by law 
to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law, including a private person, 
is justified in doing whatever is required, so long as he acts reasonably); id. § 25.1(10) 
(similarly stating that “[a] person who commits an act or omission that would otherwise 
constitute an offence is justified in committing it if: (a) a public officer directs him or her to 
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division of labor between the exercise of decision-making powers and the 
carrying out of the justified conduct. 
In many other cases, however, the individual making the decision and the 
individual carrying out the justified conduct are one and the same. When 
police officers execute warrantless arrests96 or when they use force to prevent 
the commission of an offense,97 they both decide that the conduct is justified 
and carry out that justified conduct. Although the division of labor between 
decision making and carrying out the conduct is not quite so obvious, it is still 
present in the hierarchical structure of state decision making that lurks in the 
background of such situations. In the state, as in any bureaucratic 
organization,98 the general impetus is to ensure that legal decision making 
powers are exercised at the highest ranks—even though it is often much lower-
ranked individuals who carry out the justified conduct. Because the justice of 
the peace sits higher in the state decision-making hierarchy than a police 
officer, the officer must ask the justice of the peace for a warrant to proceed 
with a search or an arrest unless it would be impracticable under the 
circumstances to wait for permission.99 The same logic explains why the power 
of lower-ranking officials is usually narrower than that accorded to their 
superiors in the hierarchy.100 Only in cases where it is impracticable to divide 
labor in this way do the two roles—deciding what is justified and carrying out 
the justified conduct—actually overlap. Even though police officers have the 
power to decide when it is justified to arrest or to search in some cases, this is 
only, faute de mieux, because no more senior state official is available to do so in 
their place. 
 
commit that act or omission and the person believes, on reasonable grounds, that the public 
officer has the authority to give that direction”); id. § 27 (authorizing the use of force to 
prevent the commission of an offense); Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 3(1) (Eng.) 
(justifying “such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in 
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons 
unlawfully at large” by any person). 
96.  See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 31, 495 (1985). 
97.  Id. §§ 25(1), 25(4), 30. 
98.  The classic text on the theory of bureaucracy is MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1968). 
99.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
100.  There are also a number of provisions that require police officers to defer to the decisions of 
their superiors in order to engage in justified conduct. In Canada, many of these provisions 
are to be found in an omnibus justification provision set out in section 25.1 of the Criminal 
Code of Canada. Subsection (3) of that provision empowers senior officials such as the 
minister of public safety and emergency preparedness to designate individuals to carry out 
otherwise prohibited conduct. Subsection (6) empowers “senior official[s]” to determine 
what conduct is justified for public officers to undertake. 
1070.THORBURN.1130.DOC 4/22/2008 3:39:00 PM 
justifications, powers, and authority 
1107 
 
As with justifications claimed by private fiduciaries, this legal power-based 
account of justifications is best able to explain why justifications have both a 
reasons requirement and a fault standard of reasonable belief. Once again, the 
reasons requirement is a result of the limitations on the power of state officials 
to permit violations of general criminal prohibitions. Unlike private persons 
consenting to the use of their own bodies and interests, officials cannot exercise 
their legal powers arbitrarily.101 For this reason, when public officials deem a 
particular course of conduct to be justified, they must always be in a position to 
explain this judgment in terms of specific, legally recognized justifying 
purposes: police officers are entitled to invade another’s privacy as part of a 
search, they are entitled to assault citizens while arresting them, and so on. 
Accordingly, such permissions do not permit just any invasion of privacy or 
any assault, but only those that (wholly or partially) constitute a search or an 
arrest. Second, this powers-based approach is also best able to explain the fault 
standard of reasonable belief for justifications. The police officer who makes an 
arrest without a warrant is justified in doing so if and only if his decision that 
the arrest was justified was made on the basis of reasonable and probable 
grounds. 
3. Ordinary Citizens with Public Powers 
Finally, the justification defenses that have attracted by far the most 
attention among criminal law theorists are those that arise from the exercise of 
decision-making powers by ordinary citizens102 caught in extraordinary 
situations, such as self-defense (understood broadly to include not only 
defense of self but also defense of property and defense of others), citizen’s 
arrest, and (where the defense exists) lesser evils. If we wish to show that our 
account truly applies to all justification defenses, then it will be crucial—but 
also most challenging—to show that it applies even in this context. It is much 
more difficult to demonstrate the connection of this group of justification 
defenses to the exercise of decision-making power than it is for the other two 
groups, for two reasons. First, there is never an actual division of labor here 
between those individuals whose job it is to decide what conduct is justified 
 
101.  We shall return to the rationale for this limitation on the exercise of legal powers by state 
officials, see infra Part III, but it is clearly a general feature of present doctrine that they are 
answerable for the exercises of legal powers. 
102.  I call them “ordinary citizens” only to distinguish them from individuals who either act as 
private fiduciaries or who act as public officials. But they need not be “ordinary” in any 
other sense. As I shall discuss in greater detail below, many—indeed, perhaps even most—of 
these “ordinary citizens” are in fact private security personnel. 
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under the circumstances and those whose job it is to carry out that justified 
conduct. As a result, it is more difficult to identify the exercise of decision-
making power. Second, it is a good deal more difficult to explain why some 
ordinary citizens, rather than any others, should be the ones to decide when it 
is justified to interfere with the interests of others. 
Although these two problems are particularly acute among justifications in 
this category, we have encountered them both already elsewhere. In a number 
of situations, we have already found that one and the same person both decides 
whether a particular course of conduct is justified and also carries it out. In the 
case of parents and their children, for example, it is generally the parent who 
both decides what conduct is justified in the circumstances and then also 
carries out that conduct. The same is true of doctors deciding when to operate 
in an emergency and then carrying out the operation, and of police constables 
making a warrantless arrest and many other situations. There is no reason in 
principle why the same person cannot perform both functions. 
We have also encountered situations where individuals who do not have 
significant decision-making powers are entitled to decide what conduct is 
justified in certain circumstances only because other, better qualified decision 
makers are temporarily unavailable. For example, the police officer making an 
arrest without a warrant is entitled to make the decision that the arrest is 
justified only because recourse to a justice of the peace is impracticable under 
the circumstances. If we think of ordinary citizens as the lowest ranks of 
officialdom (below even the police constable), then the structure of 
justifications such as self-defense, lesser evils, and citizen’s arrest is most 
readily apparent. Private citizens do not have a standing power to make these 
decisions; rather, they are entitled to decide when it is appropriate to use force 
in self-defense, to prevent a greater evil, or to effect an arrest only where 
recourse to state officials is impracticable. Indeed, it is a generally accepted 
matter of criminal law doctrine that private citizens are not entitled to use force 
in self-defense, to effect a citizen’s arrest, or to avoid the greater evil if someone 
closer to the center of state decision-making authority was available to make 
that determination.103 This is just another way of stating the law’s imminence 
limit on justifications that are available to ordinary citizens.104 
 
103.  However, as Clifford Rosky points out, in the United States, “[p]rivate police are often 
‘deputized,’ or given general public police authority, by federal, state, and local 
governments.” Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 898 (2004) (citing, as examples, 
Georgia and South Carolina statutes).  
104.  Although most U.S. jurisdictions focus on the temporal imminence of an attack in the law of 
self-defense, the Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the more basic concern 
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That is, just as the police officer must defer to the justice of the peace’s 
decision whether or not to perform a search or an arrest whenever it is 
practicable to do so, the ordinary citizen must similarly defer to the police 
officer’s decision. Where it is open to a citizen to withdraw from a situation 
and seek the assistance of a police officer, she is not entitled to make any 
decisions about whether it is permissible to use force in self-defense or to 
prevent the greater evil.105 Finally, the scope of the legal powers available to 
ordinary citizens is consistently narrower than those available to justices of the 
peace and narrower even than those available to police officers.106 In other 
words, citizens, like police officers, must defer whenever possible to those who 
are higher up the state’s decision-making hierarchy than themselves. Indeed, 
there are even echoes of this hierarchical structure of decision-making power in 
the Model Penal Code’s insistence that the lesser evils justification is open to 
citizens only where the legislature has not already specifically decided 
otherwise.107 
 
(reflected in the Canadian statutory language) is not temporal imminence for its own sake, 
but rather the absence of any lawful alternative course of action. See R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 852, 883-91 (Can.) (citing Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 34(2) (1985)). 
On this view, it is therefore a matter of some urgency to ask when the police can be counted 
on to provide such a lawful alternative. This has been an issue in cases involving battered 
women. See, e.g., R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.). It has also arisen in countries 
where there is little or no rule of law. See, e.g., R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (Can.). 
105.  Indeed, in the United States, this feature of the defense of necessity is quite strictly 
construed. The defense was famously denied to New York prison inmates who captured 
guards and civilians as hostages and threatened to assault and kill them, in protest against 
allegedly deplorable prison conditions. In denying the defense, the court held that the 
injuries feared were not imminent, and therefore, the prisoners had legal alternatives 
through which to air their grievances. See People v. Brown, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 
1972). An Indiana court denied the defense to a juvenile who claimed he brought a handgun 
to school in order to protect himself from threatened retaliation by a gang of which he had 
formerly been a member. The court held that there had been reasonable, legal alternatives 
that the defendant had bypassed, such as seeking help from his parents, informing the 
police, or requesting an absence from school. See Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1999). Further, the defense of necessity has been universally denied in cases of civil 
disobedience and political protest because of the availability of legal alternatives. See, e.g., 
United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Cozzens, 490 N.W.2d 184 
(Neb. 1992); State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1980). 
106.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
107.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (1981) (“Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to 
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that . . . (b) neither the 
Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the 
specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed 
does not otherwise plainly appear.”). 
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As with both of the other two classes of justification defenses, this powers-
based account makes the best sense of both the reasons requirement and the 
fault standard of reasonable belief. The reasons requirement flows from the 
fact that before undertaking the justified conduct, the actor must first have 
decided that his course of action was justified under the circumstances. In order 
to have rendered that decision, he must first have considered the reasons that 
would justify his course of action. We can also make best sense of the fault 
standard of reasonable belief when we keep in mind the crucial role of 
decision-making power in the structure of these justification defenses. The law 
recognizes conduct as justified so long as the relevant person has validly 
decided that it is justified, based on the facts available to him in the 
circumstances. It would be absurd to criticize such a decision on the basis of 
facts that only became evident later, at the time of trial. And since conduct is 
justified so long as the appropriate decision maker validly held it to be justified 
at the time, the appropriate standard to apply is one of reasonable belief at the 
time rather than correctness after the fact. 
C. Summary 
Justification defenses generally—whether they concern private fiduciaries, 
public officials, or even private citizens caught in extraordinary situations—all 
exhibit the same basic juridical structure. In each case, they involve the exercise 
of a legal power by an authorized individual deciding whether or not otherwise 
prohibited conduct is justified under the circumstances. The exercise of a legal 
power by private fiduciaries over the interests of the beneficiary is subject to 
the strict standards of the fiduciary relation: the fiduciary may only do so in the 
interests of the beneficiary. The exercise of legal power by public officials over 
the interests of those within their jurisdiction is also subject to a number of 
important limits that are set out piecemeal in the criminal law. Finally, the 
exercise of legal power by ordinary citizens over the interests of others more 
generally is subject to constraints similar to those of the public official. The 
only significant difference is that the powers available to private citizens are 
narrower even than those available to the lowest-ranking public official, for 
they are available only when the private citizen is unable to seek assistance 
from the authorities. 
iii. justifying justifications 
My argument so far has been limited to a claim about the conceptual 
structure of Anglo-American criminal law doctrine and the institutional 
division of labor that it sets out. I have argued that, contrary to the received 
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wisdom on this issue, it is neither the legislature nor the trial court that 
determines what conduct is justified. Instead, the criminal law recognizes a 
third class of persons—decision makers—who have the legal power to decide 
when it is justified to do what the criminal law generally prohibits. Sometimes, 
those decision makers are judges or justices of the peace issuing warrants; 
sometimes they are public officials such as police officers or firefighters; 
sometimes they are private fiduciaries such as parents or doctors; and 
sometimes they are just ordinary citizens caught in extraordinary situations. 
But whoever those decision makers may be in any particular case, they play a 
crucial role in the structure of justification defenses. The legislature does not 
set out precisely what conduct is justified in advance; instead, it relies on these 
power-holders to decide that question based on their appreciation of the 
circumstances. Similarly, trial courts do not decide whether conduct is 
justified; instead, they simply review the authoritative decisions of these 
power-holders on that question. 
A. Reorienting the Normative Debate 
Now, if my claims about conceptual structure and institutional division of 
labor are correct, what normative consequences follow? Indeed, do any 
normative consequences follow at all? Surely it is criminal law doctrine that 
should change in response to normative argument, not the other way around. 
But the point here is not that we must adjust our normative arguments so that 
they support the structure of criminal law doctrine exactly as it is. Rather, the 
point is that our normative concerns with a particular doctrine should vary 
with our understanding of precisely what role that doctrine plays within the 
larger enterprise of criminal law. As I shall suggest in this final Part, once we 
place justification defenses in their appropriate institutional setting, we find 
that they are the battleground for a quite different set of normative issues than 
the ones that have occupied criminal law theorists over the past thirty years. 
 
1. Different Structure, Different Norms 
The sorts of normative issues we focus on in a particular area usually follow 
from our assumptions about the conceptual structure and institutional division 
of labor that is at work in that area.108 This tight connection between 
 
108.  As I have tried to make clear in my discussion of Robinson, Fletcher, and Gardner, see supra 
Section I.B, all three of these commentators in fact base much of their argument on certain 
assumptions about institutional division of labor in criminal law. I do not mean to suggest, 
however, that they see themselves as making an argument based on institutional division of 
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normative and descriptive aspects of criminal law theory is evident in both of 
the accounts of justifications we have surveyed. Despite their differences on the 
substantive test for justifications, Robinson, Fletcher, and Gardner are in 
agreement that the courts are the appropriate institutional actors to determine 
whether a particular course of action was justified. Although they insist that 
justifications concern what conduct ordinary citizens may or may not do, they 
all agree that we can only know for sure whether a course of action is justified 
ex post facto—that is, once a trial court has examined all the facts available to it 
and made its determination. Robinson, Fletcher, and Gardner therefore focus 
their energies debating the appropriate substantive standard courts should 
apply in making such ex post evaluations. 
My argument about the conceptual structure of justification defenses and 
the resulting institutional division of labor leads to a somewhat different set of 
normative concerns. Because I argue that it is individual decision makers, not 
courts, who determine when conduct is justified, I argue that it is a mistake for 
criminal law theorists to focus exclusively on the substantive norms that should 
guide judicial decision making on these matters. Instead, they should pay more 
careful attention to the subtle and sometimes complex ways in which the 
criminal law allocates decision-making authority. Indeed, by shifting the focus 
of attention away from the substantive norms by which we determine whether 
conduct is justified toward the authority of decision makers to decide what 
nonideal conduct is and is not permissible as a means of preserving or restoring 
ideal conditions, my argument raises questions of legitimacy and power that 
extend well beyond the debate about justification defenses. The philosopher 
John Searle expresses this more general point as follows: 
One of the great illusions of the era is that “Power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun.” In fact power grows out of organizations, i.e., 
systematic arrangements of status-functions. And in such organizations 
the unfortunate person with a gun is likely to be among the least 
powerful and the most exposed to danger. The real power resides with 
the person who sits at a desk and makes noises through his or her 
mouth and marks on paper. Such people typically have no weapons 
other than, at most, a ceremonial pistol and a sword for dress 
occasions.109 
 
labor. One of the advantages of my account is that it makes explicit the institutional division 
of labor that is at work in criminal law in a way that other accounts do not. 
109.  JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 117-18 (1995). 
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That is, criminal law theorists who are interested in the important questions of 
power and legitimacy should spend far less time worrying about what low-
level actors (such as beat cops, border guards, corrections officials, and 
ordinary citizens) do when they are engaged in justified conduct. Instead, they 
should spend time focusing on how power holders (such as justices of the 
peace, police officers, and even private citizens) exercise their discretion when 
they decide what generally prohibited conduct is and is not justified under the 
circumstances.  
 Although the normative questions that arise under my account of 
justification defenses are quite different from the ones that criminal law 
theorists have focused on over the years, they are not altogether new. Indeed, 
they are some of the most enduring normative issues that we face anywhere in 
the legal system. These issues can be generalized into three overarching 
questions. First, we are concerned with the question of authority: on what 
grounds can we say that these decision makers have the authority over others 
to decide when it is justified to interfere with their interests? Second, we are 
concerned with the problem of discretion: how much discretion should power-
holders have to decide when it is justified to interfere with the interests of 
others? And third, we are concerned with the problem of legality: how can 
courts render the exercise of discretion by these decision makers consistent 
with the rule of law? I do not promise even to scratch the surface of these three 
deep and ancient problems. In what follows, I mean only to highlight some of 
the ways in which they arise in the context of justification defenses and to show 
how these problems are crucially related to issues in a few other areas of the 
law. But before we turn to these questions (in Section III.B), it is worthwhile 
to pause for a moment to consider the role that justification defenses play 
within the larger system of criminal law. 
2. Consent and Individual Autonomy 
Justifications are not the only place in the criminal law where individuals’ 
decisions determine the scope of permissible conduct. The power of 
individuals to consent to interferences with their own interests110 is probably 
 
110.  This qualification is crucial. Many justification defenses crucially involve what is usually 
called the granting of consent—but not to interferences with our own interests. We often say 
that a justice of the peace consents to a search or an arrest, for example, or a family member 
consents to the withdrawal of treatment from her terminally ill relative. But in all cases of 
justifications, the legal power is exercised over the interests of another. And it is precisely 
because the legal power is exercised over the rights of others that it requires justification. For 
1070.THORBURN.1130.DOC 4/22/2008 3:39:00 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1070  2008 
1114 
 
the most familiar example of this sort of phenomenon.111 But, as Peter Westen 
makes clear, consent does not operate as a justification defense but as a 
negative element of many offenses. He explains the situation as follows: 
Most offenses are offenses of non-consent. Thus, larceny is not the 
taking of another’s property as such, but the forcible taking of another’s 
property without his consent. Kidnapping is not the forcible removal or 
confinement of a person as such, but the forcible removal or 
confinement of a person without his consent. So, too, with offenses of 
trespass, theft, and assault. Legal consent by S vis-à-vis A transmutes 
what would otherwise be “larceny” by A into charity; “kidnapping” into 
companionship; “trespass” into hospitality; “assault” into sport; 
“maiming” into surgery; and “rape” into intimacy.112 
Westen is clearly right that, as a doctrinal matter, consent generally 
operates as a negative element of particular offenses rather than as a distinct 
justification defense.113 But there is also a deeper explanation for this doctrinal 
difference that concerns the very different ways that these two exercises of 
decision-making power affect claims of individual freedom.114 When 
individuals grant consent to the use of their own bodies and property, that 
consent is best understood as a way for them to extend the scope of their 
freedom. Although there are some things that we can choose to do with our 
bodies and our property all by ourselves, there are also a great many things that 
we can only do together with others.115 Indeed, Westen’s examples of charity, 
companionship, hospitality, and intimacy are all activities of that sort. Consent 
 
the rest of this Part, I use “consent” as a shorthand for “consent to interferences with our 
own interests.” 
111.  Joseph Raz draws the distinction neatly as follows: 
[W]e can divide powers into powers over oneself and powers over others. The 
most important species of power over oneself is the power to undertake voluntary 
obligations. Power over others is authority over them. . . . It is interesting to note 
that when speaking of a person’s authority over himself, we always refer to his 
power to grant himself permissions or powers. 
  JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 19 (1979). 
112.  PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT 
AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 111 n.12 (2004). 
113.  To some, this is a controversial claim. See A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW 
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 611 (2d ed. 2003); Gardner, supra note 51, at 820. 
114.  See supra note 2. 
115.  Action that is irreducibly social is the subject of a large and growing philosophical literature. 
See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (1989); RAIMO TUOMELA, THE IMPORTANCE OF 
US: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF BASIC SOCIAL NOTIONS (1995). 
1070.THORBURN.1130.DOC 4/22/2008 3:39:00 PM 
justifications, powers, and authority 
1115 
 
is the legal mechanism that allows us to use our bodies and property in these 
irreducibly social activities.116 
The reason why lack of consent is an important element of so many 
offenses is that the wrongness of the conduct in question lies precisely in the 
fact that it constitutes a usurpation of another person’s exclusive power to 
decide what shall be done with her body or property.117 Although a good deal 
of effort has been made over the years to explain such offenses purely in 
consequentialist terms (by suggesting that nonconsensual conduct is always 
more harmful than similar consensual conduct), this sort of argument has 
never gained much traction.118 Instead, it is now widely understood that all of 
these offenses are usurpations of another’s exclusive power to decide what shall 
happen to his body and property—and that the equivalent conduct, when 
undertaken with valid consent, is not wrongful (and needs no justification) 
because it is simply carrying out the other’s wishes. As such, consent affirms 
the other party’s power to determine the use to which his body and property 
may be put, rather than undermining it.119 
Despite their deep similarities, then, justifications appear to be the mirror 
image of consent in at least one important respect: rather than expanding 
individual freedom, justifications seem to represent a fundamental attack upon 
it. Rather than giving individuals greater power to decide what happens to 
themselves and to what is theirs, justifications give power to others to decide 
 
116.  The legal limits on the power of consent are best understood as flowing from this rationale. 
For example, under the Model Penal Code, one does not have the power to consent to 
serious bodily injury that is not inflicted as part of an athletic contest or “other concerted 
activity.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2) (1981). And in Canada, one does not have the power 
to consent to activities that cannot easily be conceived of as cooperative such as the infliction 
of death or serious injury. See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 
(Can.); R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714 (Can.); see also Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., 
ch. C-46, § 14 (1985). 
117.  In the context of property, Jeremy Waldron famously stated that “[t]he concept of 
ownership is the very abstract idea . . . that the decision of the named individual object 
about what should be done with an object is taken as socially conclusive.” JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 52 (1988); see also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and 
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2008). 
118.  For two strong critiques of the consequentialist account of consent, see John Gardner & 
Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 193, 193-217 
(Series No. 4, Jeremy Horder ed., 2000); and Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2006). 
119.  Arthur Ripstein puts this point very powerfully in terms of what he calls “the sovereignty 
principle.” Ripstein, supra note 118, at 215. 
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what happens to us and to our interests.120 Indeed, I shall argue this important 
difference between consent and justifications presents the deepest problem of 
legitimacy for justifications. It is important to note here the radical difference 
between the law’s attitude toward the exercise of legal power in consent and in 
justifications. The law treats our consent to others’ interference with our bodies 
and our property as just another exercise of our freedom. Accordingly, just as 
the law leaves it up to us to decide how to use our own bodies or property as 
we see fit, it also leaves it up to us to decide as we wish whether to grant or 
withhold consent to others’ use of our bodies and property. But when it comes 
to the exercise of legal powers in justifications, the law does not give the 
decision maker nearly so much discretion. Whenever someone makes a 
decision about when it is justified to interfere with another’s interests, the law 
requires (at least) that her decision be based on the right sorts of reasons and 
that it be the result of the right sort of deliberation. 
3. Prohibitions and Justifications, Ideal and Nonideal Theory 
Why does Anglo-American criminal law leave it to the discretion of 
particular decision makers to determine when it is justified to do what the law 
generally prohibits? Why doesn’t the legislature simply set down a complete set 
of conduct rules dealing even with these situations as Robinson suggests? Or, 
if some of these questions are to be dealt with elsewhere, why don’t we leave it 
up to the courts to settle these questions at trial as Fletcher and Gardner 
suggest? The answer, it seems, lies in a deep difference between the law’s 
prohibitions and its justification defenses. Borrowing John Rawls’s distinction 
between the “ideal” and the “nonideal,” we may think of the criminal law’s 
prohibitions collectively as what he calls “ideal theory”121—the terms on which 
 
120.  Of course, some justifications (such as the justification available to police officers to run red 
lights and to exceed the speed limit when in hot pursuit of a suspect) do not involve 
interference with the body or property of any other individual. Instead, they involve 
interferences with the public interest in road safety. Nevertheless, because the rules of the 
road are essential preconditions to the exercise of individual liberty, interferences with these 
public interests should be seen as interferences with individual freedom. For the most 
detailed argument for this position, see Arthur Ripstein, Public Right in Kant: A Road Map 
(2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). 
121.  John Rawls famously argues that the appropriate way to make out a theory of justice is to 
begin by setting out a (conceptually prior) ideal theory. “Thus the principles of justice that 
result are those defining a perfectly just society, given favorable conditions.” JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 309 (2d ed. 1999). These fair and stable terms of interaction under ideal 
conditions provide a yardstick by which to determine what constitutes a just response to 
injustice (in which category he includes “punishment and compensatory justice”) or to other 
nonideal conditions (in which category he includes “the natural features of the human 
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we would ideally like to interact with one another. According to Rawls’s 
account, ideal theory is entirely nonpurposive because it simply sets out a 
framework of fair and stable terms of interaction within which individuals can 
pursue their own ends as they see fit. As such, it is the sort of thing that is best 
set out in clear, general terms by the legislature. Criminal law justifications, by 
contrast, can be thought of as the law’s “nonideal theory”—concerned with the 
way in which we may respond justly to injustice and to other “nonideal” 
conditions. As such, it is appropriate that justifications are set out in remedial, 
purposive terms.122 It is also appropriate that rather than dictating precisely 
what is and is not permissible, they simply grant a limited sphere of discretion 
to decision makers to determine how best to preserve or to restore ideal 
conditions. 
B. Justifications and the Control of Discretion 
In this last Section of the Essay, I consider how the law addresses some of 
the major normative issues that arise in the context of justifications: the 
questions of authority, discretion, and legality. Once again, I group justifications 
according to the status of the decision maker. The first class of justifications, 
which arises from an exercise of decision-making power by private fiduciaries, 
is in some sense the least problematic. Here, the private law of fiduciary 
relations explains why the fiduciary has the authority to make decisions for the 
beneficiary, how much decision-making discretion he should wield, and how 
courts should review those exercises of discretion in order to render them 
compatible with the rule of law.  
The second class of justifications, which arises from the decision-making 
power of public officials, is slightly more complicated. Here, it requires a good 
deal more effort to explain how public officials have the authority to make 
decisions regarding the interests of citizens and what sort of decision-making 
 
situation, as with the lesser liberty of children”). Id. at 244. He writes: “The reason for 
beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic 
grasp of these more pressing problems.” Id. at 9. 
122.  Christine Korsgaard has pointed out the purposive/nonpurposive distinction between ideal 
and nonideal theory as follows: 
Nonideal conditions exist when, or to the extent that, the special conception of 
justice cannot be realized effectively. In these circumstances our conduct is to be 
determined in the following way: the special conception becomes a goal, rather 
than an ideal to be lived up to; we are to work toward the conditions in which it is 
feasible. 
  CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, The Right To Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, in CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS 133, 148 (1996). 
1070.THORBURN.1130.DOC 4/22/2008 3:39:00 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1070  2008 
1118 
 
discretion they should wield over those citizens. It is in this context, however, 
that the standards of judicial review rendering the exercise of discretionary 
decision making consistent with the rule of law are most highly developed.  
Finally, the third class of justifications, which arises from the exercise of 
decision-making power by ordinary citizens caught in extraordinary 
circumstances, is the most complicated of all. It is not at all obvious why 
ordinary citizens should ever have decision-making authority over their fellow 
citizens, nor is it clear how much discretion they should wield when doing so. I 
shall suggest that the best way to understand these justification defenses is to 
see them as special cases, ones that warrant extension of the principles that 
apply to public officials. The decision-making authority of ordinary citizens is 
derived entirely from their role as stand-ins for public officials who are unable 
to make those decisions themselves. Accordingly, I shall argue, we should look 
to public law for the grounds of their authority, the appropriate constraints on 
their discretion, and for the appropriate standards by which courts should 
review their decisions.  
1. Private Fiduciaries 
A great many criminal law justifications, as we have seen, arise from the 
exercise of decision-making power by private fiduciaries over the interests of 
their beneficiaries. Fiduciary relations are in some sense exceptional 
arrangements precisely because of the threat they pose to individual freedom. 
As a result, only in unusual circumstances does the law recognize that one 
individual has the authority to make decisions about the affairs of another. In 
some cases, this apparent threat to individual freedom is illusory. When two 
competent adults agree to establish a fiduciary relationship between 
themselves—as doctor and patient, or shareholder and director of a 
corporation—we should not think of the power of the fiduciary to make 
decisions about the beneficiary’s interests as undermining the latter’s 
individual freedom. Rather, institutional arrangements built around the 
fiduciary relation such as corporations, trusts, and professions all provide 
individuals with a greater variety of ways to arrange their affairs from which 
they may choose. So long as the entrusting party does not cede decision-
making power absolutely,123 we can consider the fiduciary relationship to be 
 
123.  Of course, an absolute and irrevocable grant of decision-making authority would crucially 
undermine individual freedom. But this is why residual control rights are essential to the 
legitimacy of such fiduciary arrangements. Indeed, D. Gordon Smith suggests that the 
retention of residual control rights by the beneficiary is “the defining attribute of fiduciary 
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just another instrument by which the beneficiary may exercise his individual 
freedom. The fiduciary has the authority to make decisions over the 
beneficiary’s affairs conferred on him by the beneficiary himself. 
In addition to these fiduciary relationships that arise through bilateral 
agreement, however, there are also a great many other such relationships where 
the fiduciary wields decision-making power over the affairs of a beneficiary 
who never consented to such an arrangement. In all these cases, the law 
entrusts decision-making power over the beneficiary’s affairs to a fiduciary 
because the beneficiary is incompetent to make decisions for herself. This is 
true both of fiduciary relations that arise by operation of law (say, as between 
natural parent and child) and those that arise by unilateral undertaking (say, as 
between adoptive parent and child, or between doctor and unconscious patient 
in need of emergency medical care). In all these cases, someone is needed to 
speak for the beneficiary because she cannot speak for herself (because she is a 
minor, unconscious, or otherwise legally incompetent). Sometimes the law 
looks to a natural connection between fiduciary and beneficiary (as in the case 
of biological parents and their children) and at other times the law looks to the 
undertaking of a potential fiduciary to determine who should stand in the 
position of fiduciary. In these cases, however, the fiduciary relationship 
operates as a remedy to a particular problem: who should speak for those who 
cannot (legally) speak for themselves? The fiduciary’s authority over the 
beneficiary is slightly more controversial in these cases for, rather than 
representing an expression of the beneficiary’s choice, it is the law’s effort to 
provide a substitute in the absence of any choice by the beneficiary. 
Because the fiduciary wields at least some discretionary decision-making 
authority in all fiduciary relations, there is always the possibility that the 
fiduciary will not exercise that discretion in the beneficiary’s best interests, as 
he should. Because the fiduciary has the power to make decisions regarding the 
affairs of another, he might be tempted to ignore the beneficiary’s interests 
either because he prefers to pursue his own interests or simply because he is 
too lazy or careless to put forth the effort required to pursue those interests 
properly. It is in order to control these two sorts of agency problems that 
fiduciary law imposes the twin fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. The 
problem of the fiduciary relation has been described as follows: “[It] is a 
relation in which the principal’s interests can be affected by, and are therefore 
dependent on, the manner in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has 
been delegated to him. The fiduciary obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the 
 
relationships.” D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1405 (2002). 
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control of this discretion.”124 The fiduciary’s duties require him to exercise his 
legal power over the beneficiary’s interests with reasonable care (avoiding 
laziness and incompetence) and in the beneficiary’s best interests rather than 
his own (avoiding self-dealing). Thus, parents may decide that it is justified to 
use force on their children—but only if they reasonably125 conclude that it is in 
the best interests of their child to do so;126 and doctors may decide that they are 
justified in invading the patient’s bodily integrity by performing an 
operation—but only if they reasonably deem the operation to be in the best 
interests of the patient.127 
2. Public Officials and the Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
It is often said that public officials stand in a fiduciary relationship to the 
people.128 In many cases, courts not only make this general claim, but go on to 
list quite specific tenets of fiduciary law as applicable to public officials in the 
 
124.  Weinrib, supra note 73, at 4. In a later article, Weinrib sets out the problem of fiduciary 
relations in slightly different terms, highlighting the importance of the legal status of both 
parties as equal, self-determining agents: 
[W]hen one party acts on behalf of the other, the law supposes that the 
dependence of the beneficiary on the fiduciary would transform the former into a 
possible means for the latter, and thus be inconsistent with their equality as self-
determining agents, unless accompanied by a beneficiary’s entitlement to the 
fiduciary’s loyalty. 
  Ernest J. Weinrib, The Juridical Classification of Obligations, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
OBLIGATIONS 37, 46 (Peter Birks ed., 1997). 
125.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
126.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also ASHWORTH, supra note 76, at 150.  
127.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
128.  It is not nearly so clear why state officials and citizens find themselves in this position. 
Consent-based accounts of state authority (whether actual or hypothetical) seem to suggest 
that the relation between state and citizen is either one of contract or a fiduciary one 
founded in mutual agreement (such as the relationship between shareholder and corporate 
director). But given the failings of most consent-based arguments for the authority of the 
state, it might seem more helpful to construe this relationship as a fiduciary relationship 
founded on necessity, akin to the relationship between parent and child or doctor and 
unconscious patient. Kantians, for example, might argue that the state is necessary to 
exercise certain powers that are simply impossible for individuals acting on their own to 
exercise. But this argument in political theory extends well beyond the scope of this essay. 
On the failings of explicit consent-based arguments for state authority, see A. JOHN 
SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS (2001). On 
the failings of hypothetical consent models, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 151 (1977). 
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exercise of their powers. For example, some American courts have said of 
public officials that they 
stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they have been 
elected or appointed to serve. . . . As fiduciaries and trustees of the 
public weal they are under an inescapable obligation to serve the public 
with the highest fidelity. In discharging the duties of their office, they 
are required to display such intelligence and skill as they are capable of, 
to be diligent and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not 
arbitrarily but reasonably, and above all to display good faith, honesty 
and integrity.129  
We should not be surprised to see courts insisting that a fiduciary relationship 
exists between public officials and citizens. Public officials clearly do exercise 
tremendous decision-making powers over the interests of citizens, determining 
not only when their property may be searched, when they may be arrested and 
so on, but also when they are entitled to government benefits or when they 
deserve police protection against various sorts of harm. And as we have seen, 
the exercise of decision-making power by some over the affairs of others—what 
Raz and others refer to simply as “authority”130—presents the most serious 
potential threat to individual freedom. The way that private law reconciles the 
existence of such power with individual freedom is by recognizing a fiduciary 
relationship and imposing significant limits (in the form of fiduciary duties) on 
the fiduciary’s discretion to decide matters as he sees fit. It is natural, then, that 
courts should look to precisely the same legal instrument—the fiduciary 
relation and fiduciary duties—to reconcile the freedom of individual citizens 
with the power of public officials to make decisions about their legal rights.  
 There are two aspects of the law governing decision making by public 
officials that suggest a deep connection to the private law of fiduciaries. The 
first is the duty of fairness that applies to fiduciaries who are responsible for a 
number of different beneficiaries (as in the case of parents of multiple children, 
directors of corporations with multiple shareholders, or captains of ships with 
multiple passengers). Although the fiduciary may draw distinctions between 
different beneficiaries and different classes of beneficiaries, he may not do so 
 
129.  Discoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 221 (N.J. 1952); see also Metro. Wash. 
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991); 
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 
1967); Black River Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. 
1954). 
130.  See RAZ, supra note 111. 
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arbitrarily.131 Rather, it may be said that the fiduciary owes a duty of fairness 
when deciding how to accommodate the interests of various beneficiaries. This 
raises deep and troubling questions about when a fiduciary may impose 
significant burdens on some beneficiaries for the benefit of others. For 
example, when a ship’s captain orders the jettisoning of a passenger’s property 
(or even a passenger) during a storm, the law requires not only that he must 
reasonably believe this to be in the best interests of his passengers as a whole 
(because it is necessary to save the ship in a storm), but also requires that the 
procedure through which he selects the property (or person) to be jettisoned be 
a fair one.132 And, of course, these fairness concerns arise even more commonly 
in the context of public officials who must choose quite regularly how to 
sacrifice the interests of some for the benefit of others.133 
The second aspect of the law governing decision making by public officials 
that connects it to private fiduciary law is the way in which courts treat the 
decisions of power-holders in both cases. When a fiduciary’s decision is 
challenged in the courts—say, because it is alleged that the fiduciary breached 
his duty of loyalty—courts will not address the wisdom of the fiduciary’s 
decision as such. Rather, they will show at least some deference to his decision 
making and at least some respect for his discretionary powers. Instead of 
dealing with the correctness of his decision head-on, courts will consider the 
manner in which the fiduciary reached his decision: did he pursue a self-
interested transaction without informing the beneficiary? Did he fail to exercise 
good business judgment when deciding to enter into the transaction? And so 
on. And if the fiduciary violated one of his duties (of loyalty or of care) in 
reaching his decision, then the court will usually impose a remedy designed to 
nullify the legal effect of the decision—either by voiding the resulting 
transaction directly or, where this is not a practical solution, by creating a 
constructive trust or ordering a disgorgement of profits.134 Similarly, when a 
 
131.  Howe v. Lord Dartmouth, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 56 (Ch.). 
132.  See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). 
133.  Perhaps the best-known area of public decision making where these fairness considerations 
are at play is in the law of “regulatory takings.” If a regulation unfairly targets a specific 
individual or class of individuals, then it will be treated as a taking, requiring compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978); Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Takings and Taxation: The Continuous Burdens 
Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189 (2002). 
134.  See 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5, 
at 43 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987). 
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public official’s decision is challenged by way of judicial review, the courts do 
not address the wisdom of the decision directly. Rather, they concern 
themselves with the manner in which the official exercised his discretion.135 
Further, just as courts will defer more or less to a fiduciary’s decision making 
depending on the degree of trust reposed in him,136 so courts will defer 
generally to the decision making of administrative agencies.137 Bolstering this 
parallel between private fiduciaries and public officials, a number of recent 
scholars have pointed out that courts treat public agencies and private 
fiduciaries in strikingly similar fashion.138 Although courts do not generally 
make explicit that they are imposing duties of loyalty and care in the public law 
context nor do they cite private fiduciary law as their authority for doing so,139 
the context of these duties is nonetheless present in the judicial review of 
administrative decision making. Evan Criddle summarizes the situation in 
American administrative law as follows: 
The parallels between private fiduciary duties and agency duties are 
striking. Agencies are bound to exercise reasonable prudence when 
exercising delegated powers, and they are forbidden from entering self-
interested transactions or arbitrarily discriminating between similarly 
situated beneficiaries. Courts enforce these fiduciary duties as minimal 
standards of rationality, consistency, transparency, public deliberation, 
and thoroughness in investigating alternatives.140 
While the focus of Criddle’s concern is the judicial review of administrative 
decision making more generally, our concern here is somewhat narrower. For 
 
135.  In the leading U.S. administrative law case Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court held that so long as the administrative agency’s 
decision did not contravene the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, courts should 
construe any gaps in the statutory scheme as an “express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation” and defer to any 
reasonable constructions of the statute by the agency. Id. at 843-44. 
136.  See Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 291 (1989). 
137.  See Criddle, supra note 3, at 164 (suggesting that the different levels of deference to 
administrative agencies “may best be understood not as a linear continuum but rather as a 
heterogeneous family of distinct but interrelated species”). 
138.  Id. at 151; Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEENS L.J. 259 
(2005). 
139.  In the United States, most judicial review of administrative decision making is guided by 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2000), and, to a lesser degree, the American Constitution. In other common 
law countries without such a comprehensive statutory regime (such as Canada and the 
United Kingdom), principles of natural justice play this role. 
140.  Criddle, supra note 3, at 151. 
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now, we are interested only in how courts treat the decisions of public officials 
when the decision is central to a claim of justification (such as the claim that a 
search or arrest was justified because an official granted the requisite warrant). 
Because the law subjects both private fiduciaries and public officials to strict 
fiduciary (or fiduciary-like) duties, such persons may only make decisions 
about what conduct is and is not justified according to certain, well-defined 
patterns of reasoning. The justice of the peace who must decide whether or not 
to grant a search warrant, for example, is not free to consider just any reason 
that might justify the invasion of a citizen’s privacy. Instead, he is instructed by 
the law to consider only a particular set of justifying considerations and to 
make his decision accordingly.141 (And, because the justice of the peace is 
bound by the decision rules that guide him, he might sometimes be legally 
required to grant a warrant in some cases where he thinks it to be morally 
unjustifiable, too.) Similarly, the parent who is faced with the decision whether 
or not to use physical force to punish his child is not free to consider just any 
justifying consideration. Instead, he may only consider those factors that have 
to do with the best interests of the child. Any other reasons—for example, that 
it might teach other children a lesson or that it might gain the approval of 
grandparents who advocate harsh discipline—is strictly outside the scope of 
reasons that the parent may consider when deciding whether or not to use 
disciplinary force.142 When courts are asked to determine whether a police 
officer was justified in carrying out a search or an arrest, they go through the 
same sort of reasoning as they do when asked to determine whether a private 
actor was justified in carrying out conduct that a private fiduciary had deemed 
to be justified.143 In both cases, the trial court’s main task is to undertake a 
review of the power holder’s earlier decision to permit the conduct in question; 
the court’s task is not to decide for itself whether the conduct was justified in 
light of all the evidence now available to it. Indeed, this is a point of doctrine 
 
141.  Williams v. State, 528 N.E.2d 496, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (“A search warrant must strictly 
comply with the constitutional and statutory law permitting a search and seizure.”). 
142.  One should not confuse this point with one that is similar but different. Although parents 
may not decide to use force on their children for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
child’s well-being, they must rely on certain cultural and religious norms to make their 
decisions about what constitutes the best interests of the child. For example, a Jewish parent 
might reasonably decide that it is in the best interests of his son to have a bris, but a non-
Jewish parent might not. (Thanks to Ted Diskant for drawing my attention to this 
distinction.)  
143.  Although the trial of police officers in this sort of case is unlikely, we have certainly seen 
police officers tried for excessive use of force. In the British context, there have been a 
number of high-profile trials of soldiers in Northern Ireland charged with murder in 
connection to the use of force. See Kelly v. Ministry of Defence, [1989] N. Ir. L.R. 431.  
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that is so uncontroversial that even George Fletcher (who, as we have seen, is 
committed to a correctness standard for all justifications) acknowledges it. He 
writes: “If the form of the allegations is correct and the police do not exceed the 
scope of a properly drawn warrant, there is little that the affected party can do 
to challenge the legitimacy of the intrusion.”144 That is, so long as the decision 
to allow the arrest or search was made by someone with the requisite decision-
making authority and the decision was made in the right way, courts will allow 
that decision to stand even if when they would have decided the matter 
differently based on all the facts available to them. 
3. Ordinary Citizens with Public Powers 
The greatest challenge to my powers-based account of justifications is to 
explain how ordinary citizens could legitimately exercise decision-making 
power over others, as they seem to do in situations of self-defense, lesser evils, 
citizen’s arrest, and so on. In the other two classes of justification defenses, we 
were able to provide at least the beginnings of such an explanation by referring 
to the special position of the decision makers. In private law, the fiduciary’s 
authority derives either from the consent of the beneficiary or the need for 
someone to speak in the name of the beneficiary because she is unable to speak 
in her own name. In public law, the authority of public officials to wield 
decision-making power over citizens and their interests is a highly 
controversial issue, but a good deal of Anglo-American law seems to suggest 
that it, too, can be explained in terms of the fiduciary model. 
But when we come to the justifications that turn on the decisions of 
ordinary citizens to interfere with the interests of their fellow citizens—self-
defense, lesser evils, citizen’s arrest justifications, and the like—the authority of 
these private citizen decision makers is much less clear. In each of these 
justifications, the law recognizes in ordinary people the power to make 
extremely important decisions about the interests of others: whether they may 
be killed in self-defense, whether their property may be destroyed to avoid the 
greater evil, whether they may be assaulted as part of a citizen’s arrest, and so 
on. What is particularly troubling about the exercise of such decision-making 
powers is that they seem to be wielded by individuals with no special status 
that could explain their authority to make such decisions. And this leaves us 
with the greatest problem of authority of all: if literally anyone can make 
decisions about others’ most basic interests in life, liberty, security, and 
 
144.  FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 772-73. 
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property, then the law’s claim that each person is sovereign over herself and 
her basic interests is hollow indeed. 
The beginnings of an answer to the problem of authority start to appear 
when we recall that private citizens are entitled to make these decisions about 
the interests of others only under extremely unusual circumstances. That is, we 
are entitled to decide that it is justified to kill in self-defense, that it is justified 
to violate a prohibition to avoid a greater harm, or that it is justified to use 
force to perform a citizen’s arrest only when it is essential to make that decision 
promptly and there are no properly qualified public officials available to 
consult. This tells us that there is an important division of labor taking place 
between public officials and private citizens. Whatever the moral standing of 
private citizens to use force in these situations, the criminal law in most Anglo-
American jurisdictions quite clearly treats private citizens as exercising these 
powers only as stand-ins for public officials who have the power to make these 
decisions. Private citizens do not have the authority to make such decisions in 
their own right.145 Rather, they have such authority, it seems, only insofar as 
they stand in the shoes of public officials to whom this authority belongs. 
This conclusion about the authority of private citizens to make decisions 
about when they may act in self-defense, to promote lesser evils, or to perform 
a citizen’s arrest is highly unorthodox. Particularly in recent years, a 
voluminous literature has developed discussing the precise contours of each 
citizen’s right to engage in such justified conduct. Following the lead of 
Robinson, Fletcher, and Gardner, most of that discussion simply takes for 
granted that courts should recognize conduct as justified whenever their best 
moral theory tells them that there were strong moral reasons to permit 
individuals to engage in such conduct notwithstanding the strong reasons 
against permitting it that motivated the original prohibition. But, as we have 
seen, these accounts of justifications are deeply flawed in their understanding 
of the institutional division of labor at work in justification defenses and in 
criminal law more generally. Anglo-American criminal law does not leave it up 
to trial courts to determine what conduct is and is not justified based on their 
best moral theory. Instead, the law leaves it up to another set of decision 
makers to determine in medias res whether the conduct is justified. The job of 
trial courts is to review that decision maker’s exercise of discretion for 
procedural and jurisdictional flaws and not to decide the issue de novo. 
 
145.  This is in contrast to what John Locke might suggest. For more on Locke’s account of self-
defense and the law of nature, see Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-
Relative Accounts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 711, 736 (2000). 
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Moreover, there is also substantial support over several centuries in case 
law and leading commentaries for my argument that private citizens in these 
situations act as state agents pro tempore of necessity. For example, William 
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, argues that otherwise 
prohibited conduct such as killing is legally justified only insofar as it is 
undertaken to pursue one of the state’s own purposes: for example, the court-
ordered killing of someone sentenced to death, killing that is necessary to 
apprehend someone resisting arrest, and killing to prevent a serious crime such 
as murder or rape.146 The Supreme Court of the United States recognized this 
point as follows: “At early common law only those homicides committed in the 
enforcement of justice were considered justifiable; all others were deemed 
unlawful . . . .”147 That is, the right of ordinary citizens to kill in self-defense 
derives from their power to decide to enforce the law when no officials are in a 
position to do so. The fact that citizens in such situations are exercising a 
delegated state function is most readily apparent in the case of citizen’s arrest. 
In Canada, for example, the power of arrest, even when exercised by private 
citizens, has been explicitly characterized as a delegated state power. In R. v. 
Lerke, the Alberta Court of Appeals made this point quite clearly as follows:  
Each citizen had a part to play in this system of criminal procedure 
with not only the right to make arrests, but the duty to do so in 
appropriate cases. The right and duty, however, was directly derived 
from the Sovereign himself and the citizen acting in obedience to this 
royal command functioned as an arm of the state. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The power exercised by a citizen who arrests another is in direct 
descent over nearly a thousand years of the powers and duties of 
citizens in the age of Henry II in relation to the “King’s Peace.” Derived 
from the Sovereign it is the exercise of a state function.148 
Seen in this light, the source of ordinary citizens’ legal power to decide when it 
is permissible to violate criminal prohibitions in order to defend themselves, to 
effect an arrest, to prevent a breach of the peace, or to prevent the greater evil 
 
146.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *178-82. Edward Coke also makes clear that private 
conduct such as self-defense is justified only insofar as it furthers the state purpose of law 
enforcement. See 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (Garland 
Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1644). 
147.  Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975) (emphasis added). 
148.  R. v. Lerke, [1986] 67 A.R. 390, 394-95 (Alberta Ct. App.) (Can.) (emphasis added). 
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seems quite clearly to derive from the power of front-line state officials such as 
police constables to make such decisions, as well. 
Indeed, the Canadian discussion of the powers and duties of citizens from 
the time of Henry II and Blackstone’s discussion of justifications and state 
function both remind us that the distinction between public officials and 
private citizens was not always as neat as contemporary criminal law theorists 
often assume. In the early modern period, state formation often took place not 
through the hiring of formal government employees, but rather by the 
licensing of private citizens to undertake state functions in its name.149 This 
lesson from English constitutional history about the murkiness of the public-
private divide is particularly relevant today in the age of privatization. That is, 
although criminal law theorists usually assume a neat distinction between 
public officials and private citizens, this distinction simply does not hold up in 
practice. At an amazing rate, governments across the western world are 
privatizing services that were once considered to be at the very core of the 
government’s role, from prison management to the waging of war.150 And 
where governments are not explicitly privatizing such services, they are often 
retreating from the provision of services, leaving the private sector to provide 
them in their place. This is perhaps most dramatically visible in the recent 
steady growth of the private security industry across the developed world. In 
all these cases, putatively “private” citizens—whether they are private security 
guards, private prison employees, or mercenaries—engage in conduct that is 
generally prohibited, claiming criminal justifications in their defense. 
The modern phenomenon of privatization (or given the historical 
precedent, what might more accurately be called “reprivatization”) raises 
perhaps the deepest and most difficult problems for defenders of a neat public-
 
149.  The use of ordinary citizens to carry out state functions is an ancient and familiar strategy, 
sometimes called “government by license.” See MICHAEL J. BRADDICK, STATE FORMATION IN 
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND C. 1550-1700 (2000). The same practice is in vogue once again, 
although today it is usually referred to as “reinventing government” or simply 
“privatization.” See Michael J. Trebilcock, Ron Daniels & Malcolm Thorburn, Government by 
Voucher, 80 B.U. L. REV. 205 (2000). 
150.  David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999); see also WILLIAM C. 
CUNNINGHAM, JOHN J. STRAUCHS & CLIFFORD W. VAN METER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
PRIVATE SECURITY: PATTERNS AND TRENDS (1991); TREVOR JONES & TIM NEWBURN, 
PRIVATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICING (1998); GEORGE O’TOOLE, THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
PRIVATE SPIES, RENT-A-COPS, AND THE POLICE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1978); PRIVATE 
POLICING (Clifford D. Shearing & Phillip C. Stenning eds., 1987); NIGEL SOUTH, POLICING 
FOR PROFIT: THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR (1988); David H. Bayley & Clifford D. 
Shearing, The Future of Policing, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585 (1996); Policing for Profit: 
Welcome to the New World of Private Security, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1997, at 21; Rosky, supra 
note 103. 
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private divide.151 For decades, American and Canadian constitutional scholars 
have tried to set out a workable distinction between state action that is subject 
to constitutional review and private action that is not, but to no avail.152 The 
present discussion of justifications and the manner in which the authority of 
private citizens to decide when conduct is justified seems to be derivable from 
their position as public officials pro tempore might provide a sort of new 
beginning to this deeply unsatisfying debate.153 
conclusion 
Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago 
when George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction 
between justifications and excuses. In the intervening years, however, very 
little progress has been made in exploring the structure and function of 
justification defenses. The reason for this failure, I have suggested, is a widely 
shared misconception about their place within the criminal law’s institutional 
structure. Contrary to what is generally believed, it is not up to trial courts to 
decide, ex post facto, what conduct is justified and what is not. This 
determination is made ex ante by other institutional actors such as private 
fiduciaries, public officials, and, sometimes, ordinary citizens caught in 
extraordinary circumstances. The court’s role is simply to review the validity of 
that prior exercise of decision-making discretion. 
More broadly, this study serves as a reminder of the importance of 
institutional structure in criminal law. Before addressing the substantive moral 
issues that arise in criminal law, I have argued, it is crucial first to address the 
institutional problems of authority, discretion, and legality. These problems 
 
151.  The public/private argument I raise goes well beyond the legal realist claim that the 
public/private divide is meaningless simply because all private action takes place within a 
context of public law. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 
357, 374 (1954). 
152.  This has been true for many years. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—
Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 
95 (1967) (describing state-action doctrine as a “conceptual disaster area”); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503-04 (1985) (“There still are 
no clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”); Henry Friendly, The 
Public-Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1982) (stating 
that Black’s characterization of the state-action doctrine is “even more apt today”). 
153.  Gillian Metzger provides one helpful model for making sense of the public/private divide in 
the contemporary world of privatization. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an 
Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995). 
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receive their most thorough treatment in two other areas of law: the private 
law of fiduciaries and public administrative law. If we wish to make progress in 
understanding justification defenses—and the institutional structure of 
criminal law more generally—it is to these areas of law that we should attend. 
